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This dissertation examines the rationality of social action. The firm adopting 
the “red hat” strategy or individuals seeking partners with matching assets and 
qualifications can all be seen as agents who try to maximize their utilities by searching 
for what they regard as the most profitable action. The dissertation includes three 
distinct chapters.  
The first chapter reexamines the status exchange hypothesis (Davis 1941; 
Merton1941), and specifically reanalyzes the data from Fu (2001) on recent marriages 
among whites, blacks, Mexicans, and Japanese (from the 1990 PUMS data), which 
claims to corroborate the status exchange hypothesis for intermarriage between whites 
and blacks as well as between whites and Mexican Americans. Using a simple quasi-
symmetry model, I show that the same-race and mixed-race marriage share a broadly 
similar pattern of educational homogamy, which is quasi-symmetric in character. 
Thus, I argue that this suggests little, if any, evidence for the status exchange 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the evidence strongly indicates that there is a remarkable 
consistency and symmetry in husband/wife educational attainment regardless of race 
(with the possible exception of white/white marriages); intermarried couples share a 
similar level of education, and educational homogamy dominates the educational 
marriages, no matter what their or their spouse’s races are. 
 The second chapter employs a game theory framework as well as case studies 
to examine the interactions between entrepreneurs and local governments under 
transitional institutions and examine how these actors play extensive games with 
perfect information. According to this game, the adoption of the “red hat” strategy is 
the rational results of the interaction between private firms and local governments. 
The third chapter employs multi-level logistic models to examine the ACS 
2008 data and shows that the multilevel modeling helps to decompose the variance of 
intermarriage to individual level (preference) and context-level characteristics 
constraints in the analysis of interracial marriage. Metropolitan-level variables, which 
are typically ignored in previous research, provide additional understanding of the 
previous of Asian interracial and endogamous marriage in the United States. Studies 
of interracial marriage can no longer easily overlook the population geographic 
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CHAPTER 1 A CRITIQUE OF THE STATUS EXCHANGE THEORY OF 
MERTON AND DAVIS IN MATE ASSORTING 
Introduction 
“…the reciprocal racial attraction and repulsion, might be measured by 
finding whether sexual relations are preferred or rare between two groups, and 
whether they are carried on permanently or temporarily and irregularly. In all groups 
with developed “ethnic” consciousness the existence or absence of intermarriage 
(connubium) would then be a normal consequence of racial attraction or 
segregation.” -Max Weber, Economy and Society (V,i).  
Since Weber’s famous insight that analysis of interracial marriage can shed 
light on the status of race relations in a society, sociologists have examined interracial 
marriage to uncover insights on the social structure of intergroup relations (Merton 
1941; Davis 1941). Scholars have suggested that interracial marriage can be viewed 
both as a cause and indicator of social distance and assimilation (Alba and Golden 
1986; Alba and Nee 1997; Alba and Nee 2003; Fu 2001; Gordon 1964; Kalmijn 1998; 
Lieberson, Waters et al. 1988; Park 1950). Interracial marriage rates have increased 
rapidly in the United States following the repeal of anti-miscegenation laws by the 
Supreme Court in mid-1960s. The rate of interracial marriage increased from 1.31% in 
1980 to 1.81% in year 1990 and 2.89% in 2002 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003). 
Although mixed-race marriage rates are still relatively low (compared to same-race 
marriage rates), they continue to grow rapidly, having more than doubled in the last 20 
years. The continuing interest in inter-racial marriage as a strategic indicator of both 
structure and trends in interracial relations have led to competing perspectives 
debating the significance of recent trends in intermarriage rates. Further, advances in 
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statistical methodology have contributed to focus of debates on competing 
methodological approaches in the study of inter-racial marriage. 
In this paper, I will try to accomplish three goals. First, I will introduce the 
competing theoretical approaches in the study of intermarriage: the assimilationist, 
structuralist, and exchange perspectives. Second, I will focus on a particular 
perspective, the exchange perspective and the empirical controversy1 that it has 
aroused. While I will introduce the long debate between critics and supporters, I will 
focus on a particular scholarly disagreement between Fu (2001) and Rosenfeld (2005). 
Third, I will critique the claims that each side makes in interpreting the data in an on-
going controversy over the validity of the status exchange hypothesis. Although I am 
sympathetic to Rosenfeld’s position in the debate with Fu, in which he argues that 
evidence on inter-racial marriage does not provide support for the status exchange 
hypothesis, I will propose a new model that better fits the data. 
Theory Context 
In sociology, three perspectives compete to explain the structure and trends in 
intermarriage: assimilationist, structuralist, and status exchange. While I will briefly 
discuss the first two perspectives to provide some context, the focus of this paper will 
be on the third. 
The Assimilationist Perspective 
The main proponent of the assimilationist perspective is Milton Gordon 
(1964). Its basic argument is that intermarriage is the “keystone of the arch of 
assimilation” and the indicator of social distance between groups. According to 
Gordon’s (1964) seven-stage model, assimilation starts with (1) acculturation (cultural 
                                                 
1 I make a distinction between a theoretical controversy which involves disagreement over the logical 
structure of the theory and an empirical controversy which involves disagreement over the extent to 
which data does or does not support a given theory. 
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or behavioral assimilation), proceeds to (2) structural assimilation, which is “large 
scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society in a primary 
group”, and follows with (3) marital assimilation. When large-scale intermarriage 
takes place, the minority group melts into the host society, which results in (4) 
“identificational assimilation”. The others states (5) “absence of prejudice”, (6) 
“discrimination”, and (7) “value and power conflict” follow naturally. Gordon claims 
that compared to those who do not intermarry, those who do, generally possess greater 
social, political, and economic characteristics that resemble those of the host society. 
This assimilationist view of inter-relationships has been shared by many students of 
racial and ethnic relations (Massey 1981; Massey and Mullan 1984; Lieberson, Waters 
et al. 1988; Alba and Nee 1997; Rosenfeld 2002; Alba and Nee 2003). 
The Structuralist Perspective 
The main proponent of the structuralist perspective is Peter Blau (1977; Blau, 
Blum et al. 1982; Blau, Beeker et al. 1984; Rytina, Blau et al. 1988). Its basic 
argument is that a person’s decision in selecting a mate is severely constrained by the 
social structure, despite his/her cultural attitudes. A structuralist account would, for 
example, examine how the availability of potential marriage partners in the population 
affects a person’s marital choice. Blau (1977, 1982) claims that the opportunities of 
intergroup contact are higher in a heterogeneous and residentially integrated 
community than in a homogeneous and highly segregated one. He further argues that 
intermarriage is not only affected by group-specific attributes such as group size or sex 
ratio, but also by the amount of spatial and social proximity between groups (e.g. 
socioeconomic inequality). For Blau the assorting of partners depends not only on 
preferences but also the opportunities available to partners to marry one other (i.e., 
while people make marital decisions according to their cultural preferences, their 
decisions are, nevertheless, constrained by structural reality) (Blau, 1977). The 
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usefulness of a structuralist view in intermarriage has been widely recognized, 
especially for conducting empirical research (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982; Fitzpatrick 
and Hwang 1992; Anderson and Saenz 1994; Hwang, Saenz et al. 1994; Hwang, 
Saenz et al. 1997). 
The Status Exchange Perspective 
The main proponents of the status exchange perspective are Kingsley Davis 
(1941) and Robert Merton (1941). Its basic argument is that even under the 
circumstances of rigid intergroup boundaries and despite strong preferences to marry 
within their own group, blacks with high socioeconomic status might sometimes 
marry whites with low socioeconomic status. According to Merton, marriages between 
high status blacks and lower status whites represent an informal exchange, i.e., blacks 
exchange their higher achieved socioeconomic status for whites’ higher ascribed 
social status and this exchange pattern is stronger for black husband & white wife 
pairs than for other interracial pairs. 
While there has been relatively little controversy around the first two 
perspectives, status exchange has aroused much lively debate among researchers of 
intermarriage and continues to stimulate research (Kalmijn 1998). While many 
findings reaffirmed the status exchange hypothesis (Fu 2001; Kalmijn 1993; Qian 
1997; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989;), many others have questioned its usefulness 
(Rosenfeld 2005; Heer 1974; Hwang et al. 1995; Liang and Ito, 1999; Heaton and 
Albrecht, 1996; Jacobs and Labov, 2002, Rosenfeld, 2005). The remainder of the 




The Status Exchange Perspective: the Empirical Controversy 
Advocacy for Status Exchange 
Many findings have corroborated the status exchange hypothesis. The 
harmonic mean analyses by Schoen & Wooldredge (1989) show that with respect to 
education, white women marry up more often when marrying a black man than when 
marrying a white man; similarly, black men marry down more often when marrying a 
white woman than when marrying a black woman. Parallel conclusions were reached 
in the examination of the marriage choices of white men and black women; when 
marrying exogenously, white men marry down less often and black women marry up 
less often. These asymmetries in spouses' educational characteristics were assessed 
after adjusting for the marginal distributions of education of race-sex groups and 
thereby support the hypothesis that majority men and women marry a minority spouse 
in part under the condition of socioeconomic status gains. 
Furthermore, Kalmijn (1993) proposed a hypergamy ratio2 approach to test for 
status exchange in black-white intermarriage. He compared the observed hypergamy 
ratios within interracial marriages to the expected hypergamy ratios from log-linear 
models under quasi-symmetry in which the expected hypergamy ratios only arise from 
differences in marginal distributions and not from asymmetric selection. Analyzing the 
annual marriage license data for 33 states from 1968 to 1986, he found that the 
observed hypergamy ratio in black husband and white wife marriage was much larger 
than the expected ratio (1.252 compared to the expected .928) under the quasi-
symmetry model, indicating white women are more likely to marry up than would be 
expected under the model which assumes no difference, and that the observed ratio in 
                                                 
2 The hypergamy ratio is calculated as the number of women marrying up in terms of education to the 
number marrying down. 
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white husband and black wife marriage was 0.910, compared to the expected value of 
1.289, indicating black women are more likely to marry down than would be expected. 
Similar results were found in Qian (1997). Examining interracial marriage in 
the 1980 and 1990 Census data, he found that the exchange hypothesis is consistent 
with the data on intermarriage among African Americans, Hispanic, and Asian 
Americans. Acknowledging the educational homogamy pattern in interracial marriage, 
he claimed that the odds of interracial marriage increase with the couple’s educational 
attainment, and that for interracial married couples with different educational 
attainments, minorities with high education levels tend to marry whites with low 
education levels. 
Additionally, Fu (2001) identified endogamous intermarriage, status exchange, 
and in-group preference perfective as the three underlying patterns for intermarriage. 
Moreover, he claimed to provide a better test of the status exchange hypothesis, 
arguing that his results support it especially well for intermarriage between whites and 
blacks as well as whites and Mexican Americans. But while his results are largely 
consistent with Kaimijn’s (1993) and Qian’s (1997) findings (based on the hypergamy 
ratio approach), he nevertheless, found that marriages between Japanese Americans 
and whites follow an endogamous intermarriage pattern. 
Criticism of Status Exchange 
Others have questioned the empirical support for exchange theory, particularly 
in regards to the generalization of status exchange theory to intermarriage of white and 
Asian Americans as well as white and Hispanics. Hwang et al (1995) show that this 
exchange pattern does not hold for Asian American women. They applied multinomial 
logit models to a representative U.S. sample of married Asians and find that Asian 
women with lower educational attainment have a higher probability of outmarriage, 
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while Asian men provide weak evidence of negative selectivity of SES and tend to 
marry persons with lower educational attainment than themselves. 
Liang and Ito (1999) investigated the intermarriage patterns of five Asian 
American groups (Chinese, Koreans, Indians, Japanese, and Filipinos) in the New 
York City area. Focusing in particular on gender, nativity, and education, they found 
little evidence for Merton's (1941) hypothesis. Instead, their research revealed that: 
 (1) US-born Asians are much more likely to intermarry than foreign-born Asians;  
(2) Asian women are much more likely to intermarry than Asian men; and that  
(3) intermarried individuals share educational homogeneity. 
In a later paper, Qian and colleagues (1999) applied log-linear models to 
examine assortative mating patterns by race/ethnicity, educational attainment, and 
nativity status. They found no evidence that Asian Americans marry less-educated 
whites for an exchange of "higher" racial status.  
Furthermore, Jacobs and Labov (2002) analyzed the data from the 1990 US 
Census to examine the intermarriage among 16 ethnic groups. They argued that an 
exchange pattern does not hold for the majority of Asian – non-Hispanic white 
marriages, nor for the four Hispanic groups, and concluded that the applicability of 
status exchange theory should perhaps be limited to intermarriage between blacks and 
whites.  
Yet, other scholars questioned the applicability of status exchange theory even 
to intermarriage between blacks and whites, finding that interracial marriage is 
predominantly homogamous with respect to education. Using simple tabular analyses 
Bernard (1964) found that interracial marriage as of 1960 tended to be educationally 
homogamous. Similarly, Heer (1974) claimed that most black-white marriages are 
educationally homogamous and that the racial-caste hypogamy has no empirical 
support without controlling for the availability of marriage partners by educational 
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attainment. Gadberry and Dodder (1993) replicated Bernard’s work and found that 
educational similarity in black-white marriages continued from 1960 through 1980.  
Rosenfeld (2005) examined the contradictory literature on exchange 
hypothesis with regard to black-white intermarriages and claimed that status 
homogamy in interracial marriages has been mistaken for status change due to the 
black-white inequality3. Additionally, he claimed that gender differences among 
young couples have been mistaken for racially specific patterns of exchange. In 
addition, he found that the empirical support for status exchange is not robust, and that 
the simple tabulation that questions status exchange contradicts the more sophisticated 
methods that support status exchange. Favoring simple tabular analyses, Rosenfeld has 
questioned the validity of exchange theory and the justification of its continued use. 
 
New Debate on Exchange Theory 
Rosenfeld’s research (2005) has lead to a new round of discussion and debate 
on exchange theory in mate selection. Gullickson and Fu (2010) show in their 
comment that Rosenfeld’s loglinear model is incorrect, and that he has misinterpreted 
his results. They reexamine Rosenfeld’s data with a correct specification in the model 
and find the data show evidence of status exchange between white women and black 
men but no evidence of that between white men and black women. Kalmijn’s results 
(2010) are in line with Gullickson and Fu (2010). While he recognizes the low 
observed degree of male dominance in mixed race marriages does not seem to support 
status exchange, he shows status homogamy is weaker in interracial marriage than in 
intra-racial marriage by comparing observed male dominance ratio to the expected 
level under quasi-symmetry model.  
                                                 
3 See Figure 1.2 in Appendix B for an explanation of the intermarriage pattern. 
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In a response to the above criticism, Rosenfeld (2010) argues that Gullickson 
and Fu (2010) have truncated results which exclude the best-fitting model. He shows 
that his models still support status exchange theory using Gullickson and Fu’s 
parameter. In his reply to Kalmijn, Rosenfeld argues that Kalmijn’s results are based 
on loglinear models that do not fit the data well. By adding additional controls into 
Kalmijn’s models, he shows that the models can be improved dramatically and 
overturns Kalmijn’s core result.  
 
Addressing the Controversy 
The empirical controversy mainly comes from how researchers test the status 
exchange hypothesis. Rosenfeld’s study (2005) has claimed that there is a 
contradiction in simple and complex analyses of intermarriage. He explained it via a 
robust standard errors argument and tries to reconcile it by using negative binomial 
analysis. Gullickson and Fu (2010) point out that Rosenfeld’s parameterization of 
status exchange does not measure status exchange. In turn, Rosenfeld (2010) also 
criticizes Gullickson and Fu for excluding the best-fitting model and shows that 
Kalmijn results are based poorly fitted models (Rosenfeld 2010). I will argue that this 
apparent contradiction is not real. The contradictory results are really due to the 
insistence on interpreting models that are not consistent with the data.  
Fu (2001) claimed that he has provided an improved test of the status exchange 
hypothesis. He found that the “endogamous intermarriage model + constrained 
exchange parameters” (his Model 2a and 2b) fits better for marriages between whites 
and blacks as well as between whites and Mexican Americans than the “endogamous 
intermarriage model” and the “endogamous intermarriage model + unconstrained 
exchange parameters”. Upon closer examination, one can see that the model which he 
claimed endorses the status exchange hypothesis, clearly shows a lack of fit 
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(L2=215.7116 with df=9 for whites and blacks and L2
 
=95.9568 with df=9). In 
addition, the previous model (Model 2c) fits the data much better than Fu’s preferred 
“endogamous intermarriage model” (Model 1c) for marriages between Japanese 
Americans and whites. Although he has acknowledged the significant improvement in 
fit of Model 2c over Model 1c, he still claimed Model 1c as the more appropriate 
model solely based on the BIC statistics (Bayesian Information Criterion, Raftery 
1986) when there is another model available that fits the data excellently. On the 
contrary, loglinear models that are consistent with the data clearly suggest that status 
exchange is a myth. 
Rosenfeld (2005, 2010), Gullickson and Fu (2010), and Kalmijn (201) all 
solely rely on the BIC statistics to choose the best fitting models. However, the BIC 
has some important drawbacks and is not a reliable method for model selection in this 
context (Weakliem 1999; Weakliem 2004). According to Weakliem, 1) the BIC 
assumes a unit information prior and approximates the log of the Bayes factor for the 
model of interest compared to the saturated model. The BIC uses sample size as the 
sole measure of the informativeness of the data, and overlooks the structure or design 
of the data, which can be misleading since the hypothesis of interest may depend on 
only a subset of the overall data. 2) The posterior likelihood depends on the data and 
the researcher’s prior. If researchers have different priors, they will have different 
posteriors; thus different researchers analyzing the same data may reach different 
conclusions. The BIC assumes the unit prior, a prior equivalent to the amount of 
information in a single sample point; however, the amount of information represented 
in a unit prior will vary from application to application. He argues that the BIC is not 
the “magical” criterion for choosing between models, contrary to what sociologists 
wish (See Weakliem 1999; 2004 for more details). Some researchers may continue to 
find the BIC useful as a rule of thumb for model simplification, but there is no obvious 
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reason to prefer it to other informal criteria such as the ratio of L2 to degrees of 
freedom, Akaike’s information criterion, or the index of dissimilarity. 
The status exchange hypothesis as stated by Merton (1941) and Davis (1941) 
requires couples to be different on two dimensions, i.e., races and status—without 
these differences the “exchange” cannot happen. Since intermarried couples are 
already different in races, then for “exchange” to happen, there must be a status gap 
between minorities and their white partners; in particular, in terms of education, 
minority husband has to have more education than his white wife and minority wife 
has to have more education than her white husband. If a minority and his white partner 
have the same status, then there will be no “exchange” in terms of status in interracial 
marriage.  
In addition, to account for the educational differences between minorities and 
their white partners, we need to control for their educational distribution. Historically 
men tended to marry down along education (Schoen and Wooldredge 1989). Since 
white men tended to marry white women with less education, and since men tend to 
have more education than women, it is of no surprise that this pattern also can be seen 
in the black husband and white wife marriage combination. This could partly explain 
why Merton (1941) thought that this exchange pattern is stronger for black husband-
white wife pairs than other interracial pairs. But this hypergamy pattern for women 
who marry up in education was partly due to the differential gender distribution of 
education and has become less prevalent as women’s education increased.  
Couples also tend to marry homogenously because persons with equivalent 
resource are the ones most likely to maximize their rewards (Campbell 1971; Schoen 
1986). According to Mare (1991), people have a strong tendency to marry others of a 
similar educational background and this tendency has been increasing over the last 
half century. Status homogamy tends to emerge as the most important pattern of mate 
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selection in general and it is of no surprise that homogamy is also strong in interracial 
marriages. Kalmijn (1998) and Rosenfeld (2005) have identified the theoretical bases 
for educational homogamy as individual utility maximization, affinity, and 
propinquity and exposure (See Kalmijn 1998, Rosenfeld 2005 for more details). 
Recognizing that the educational homogamy is strong in mate assorting in 
general and that there will be no “exchange” when intermarried couples have the same 
educational level, the best way to test status exchange is to examine whether the 
pattern of non-homogamous educational partnering within interracial marriage is 
asymmetric; and if it is, whether this educational association pattern is different from 
that of intra-racial marriage. Quasi-symmetry (QS) and its variants are the natural base 
models for the “no status exchange” hypothesis4. Firstly, the educational homogamy 
has already been accounted for under quasi-symmetry, in which the main diagonal 
cells that stand for educational homogamy are fitted exactly (perfectly). Secondly, the 
QS model accounts for the marginal distribution of husband’s and wife’s education. 
The symmetry model also fits the main diagonal cells perfectly, but it does not control 
for the different educational distributions of husband and wife.  
Based on the above argument, I proceed to reanalyze Fu’s (2001) data, which 
he claimed to corroborate status exchange by fitting the QS models to the cross-
classification table. After conducting a descriptive analysis, I first examine whether 
the QS pattern truly holds in the black husband & white wife and white husband & 
black wife pairs. Then I extend the QS model to other interracial as well as intra-racial 
marriage combinations to see whether the same educational association pattern holds 
                                                 
4 In order to test for status exchange, Kalmijn (1993) compared observed hypergamy ratios with the 
expected hypergamy ratios from loglinear model under quasi-symmetry. He has inexplicitly used QS 
model as a “no status exchange” for the comparison model. 
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in those cases. To assess the goodness-of-fit, I employ the likelihood-ratio test (LRT) 
and dissimilarity index.  
Data and Methods 
Data 
I reanalyze Fu’s (2001) data table which was derived from the 1990 US 
census, 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). In it, 
Fu has linked couples by the state, household serial number, and subfamily number. 
Only native-born Americans are included to exclude the possible effects of nativity on 
intermarriage. The “straight line” (linear) assimilation theory (Alba and Nee, 1997) 
predicts that the foreign-born are less exogamous than the native-born, and that the 
younger the age at which an immigrant arrives, the more predisposed to intermarriage 
he or she will be. Although it might not be true from the point of view of non-linear 
assimilation theory, it tells us that the theories are different for native born and 
foreign-born Americans (Kalmijn 1991; Kalmijn and Flap 2001).  
Fu analyzes the same-race marriage and only whites’ marriages with other 
minorities5 because relatively few interracial marriages between nonwhite groups are 
available. Couples under age 35 are selected to reduce marriage survival bias (Cf Fu, 
2001 for details). Educational attainments are classified into “less than high school 
diploma, high school diploma or equivalent, some college but less than bachelor’s 
degree, and bachelor’s degree or more” (Fu, 2001, p151). 
 
                                                 
5 Only non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic Mexican Americans, and non-Hispanic 
Japanese Americans are included. 
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Advantages and disadvantages of Census data  
Census data has been accepted as the most popular data sources for large-scale 
studies of races and ethnicity in the U.S. for its large nationally representative sample 
that makes comparison between many race groups possible. Its disadvantages for 
measuring intermarriage are well known as well (Harris and Ono, 2005; Mare 1991). 
First, census data measures the prevalence rather than the incidence of intermarriage, 
where demographic variables are measured cross-sectionally. For example, an 
individual’s socioeconomic status is to be included as an explanatory variable for a 
person’s selection of marriage partner. It would be ideal to obtain a measure prior to or 
at the time of marriage rather than using the current socioeconomic status at the time 
of survey because it is likely that a person’s socioeconomic status changes after 
marriage. Recognizing this, researchers usually use only educational attainment as an 
indicator of a person’s socioeconomic status since it not only is both highly correlated 
with occupational status and incomes but also remains unchanged over time. Besides, 
the use of occupation and income would restrict the sample to only employed persons 
and this could reduce the sample size and possibly exclude more women from the 
sample. Education thus is accepted as a reliable predictor of long-term economic well-
being (Kalmijn 1993), as it serves as a salient proxy for past and future socioeconomic 
status of the married individuals under study. 
Second, the age at first marriage is not available in most census data (1980 
census is an exception) and the census does not ask about prior marriages for currently 
married couples. Intra-marriages and intermarriages have different assortative mating 
patterns for first marriage and remarriage (Agresti 2002), it would be ideal to study 
recent first marriage. Also the passage of time is associated with increasing tolerance 
for exogamy. To minimize the selection bias caused by remarriage, intermarriages 
researchers, in practice, limit marriages to those newly-wed young couples since they 
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are more likely to have married relatively recently, and are less likely to have 
experienced a divorce and remarriage (Fu 2001; Qian 1997; Harris and Ono 2005). As 
Hwang and Saenz (1990) have noted, Census’s prevalence data does not generally 
specify time and place of marriage which “makes it extremely difficult to view 
variations in intermarriage over time or cross-sectional variations between different 
groups as indicators of differential assimilation or structural variability” (Hwang and 
Saenz, 1990, p. 564). The cross-sectional data does not allow us to locate whether the 
intermarried ethnic minorities originally lived in less segregated area or they tend to 
move out after marriage from ethnic concentrated area to suburban area where the 
majority of whites live. The longitudinal data that surmount these obstacles, which 
would enable us to draw a causal inference, are neither currently available nor likely to 
be available soon. As a result, the deficiency of the data should be kept in mind when 
drawing conclusions from this study.  
Methods 
Log-linear Models 
First some notation. For the I I×  square contingency table, let ijn denote the 
observed frequency in the ith row and jth column of the table (i=1,2,…,I ; j=1, 2, …, 
I). Let ijπ denote the probability of an observation in cell (i,j) under a theoretical 
model and ijμ  the corresponding expected frequency. The nij are assumed to have 
arisen as the result of either multinomial sampling or independent Poisson sampling. 
Loglinear models are often summarized by local odds ratios, which give the odds-ratio 
for every set of adjacent rows i and i+1 and adjacent column j and j+1. Each local 
odds ratio, ijθ , is defined as:  
 1, 1 , 1 1,( ) /( )ij ij i j i j i jθ μ μ μ μ+ + + +=  (1.1) 
Let HR, WR, HE and WE denote husband’s race, wife’s race, husband’s 
education, and wife’s education. In the context of educational association in interracial 
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marriages, ijklμ  is the expected number of marriages between husbands in education 
category i  and race k  and wives in education category j  and race l .  
 
In the next section, I consider various loglinear models for the data of the form: 
 
log HE WE HR WRijkl i j k l
HEWE HRWR HEHR WEWR HEWR WEHR





μ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ
λ
= + + + +




When the last term HEWEHRWRijklλ  is omitted, it implies HE and WE are 
independent for any given racial combination of husband and wife.  
The quasi-symmetry model for square tables was first introduced by Caussinus 
(1966) as an extension of the symmetry model. In this seminar paper, Caussinus show 
that the likelihood of a QS model can also be solved by using iterative methods. This 
paper is often referred to as the first to explain the links between quasi-independence 
(QI), symmetry (S), quasi-symmetry (QS) and marginal homogeneity (MH). Because 
of its explicit use of log-linear models and maximum likelihood methods, Causinus’ 
paper had a major influence on the development of log-linear model methodology. 
Quasi-Symmetry Model for “No Status Exchange” Hypothesis  
Here in the context of educational association, the quasi-symmetry model 
means that after adjusting for marginal distributions, odds-ratios are symmetric. The 
main diagonal cells that stand for the educational homogamy are fitted perfectly under 
the QS model. In the educational classification, quasi-symmetry means that people 
marry up and marry down in schooling are equally likely, after adjusting for the 
differences in the prevalence of educational attainment. In this sense, quasi-symmetry 
is a natural “base” model for the “no status exchange” hypothesis. 
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Variations on Quasi-symmetry 
Separate QS/Unrestricted QS 
Separate quasi-symmetry model for each racial combination. It can also be 
referred to as an unrestricted quasi-symmetry (UQS) model, where the “unrestricted” 
refers to the fact that the association parameters are allowed to depend on the HR/WR 
combination, that is, HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWRijkl jiklλ λ=  for all combinations of i and j.  
Uniform QS 
Uniform quasi-symmetry model (UniQS) for a collection of racial 
combinations; that is, all the educational association parameters are the same in each 
racial combination, HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWRijkl ijk lλ λ ′ ′=  for all ij pairs. For example, when the 
UniQS model is fitted to the mixed-race marriage, the educational association 
parameters has the property of 
12 21 13 31 14 41
HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR
ij ij ij ij ij ijλ λ λ λ λ λ= = = = =  and the local 
odds ratios follows the property of 12 21 13 31 14 41ij ij ij ij ij ijθ θ θ θ θ θ= = = = = .  
 
Analysis and Results 
In this section, I first present a graphical display of Fu’s (2001) cross-
classification table of husband’ and wife’s schooling by husband’s and wife’s race, 
which reveals that quasi-symmetry might be a suitable model for the data. Then, I fit 
various loglinear models6 for marriage between black husband and white wife (BW7), 
assess the goodness-of-fit of different models, and show the quasi-symmetry (QS) fit 
the BW subtable reasonably well. I also apply quasi-symmetry to marriage between 
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for model details. 
7 First letter represents husband’s race and second letter wife’s race, with W for whites, B for blacks, M 
for Mexican Americans, and J for Japanese Americans. For example, WB represents the couples in 
which husband is white and wife is black. There are 10 possible racial combinations: WW, WB, WM, 
WJ, BW, MW, JW, BB, MM, and JJ (Intermarriages among minorities are excluded). 
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white husband and black wife (WB) and find that the QS model fits the WB table 
extremely well. Scrutinizing the educational associational parameters for BW and WB 
tables, I find they are similar. I then fit the QS model to other racial combinations and 
find that the QS model fits the data well except for the WW table, for which I will 
discuss the statistical lack of fit and the practical lack of fit by using dissimilarity 
index. Based on the similar educational association parameters of the QS model for 
each racial combination, I finally apply the QS model to the mixed-race and the same-
race marriage excluding WW table. 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
First of all, I present the cross-classification table of Fu’s (2001) in Table 1.1 
and Figure 1.1. Table 1.1 is the cross-classification of races and educational attainment 
in percentage; within each racial combination sub-table, the cell represents ijn N , 
where ijn  is the observed cell count in Fu’s and iji jN n=∑ ∑  is the total number of 
observations for that sub-table. Figure 1.18 is a graphical display of Table 1.1, with 
the size or area of each square proportional to ijn N . Zero counts in cells (of Fu’s) are 
represented by small open circles. 
                                                 




Table 1.1 Cross-Claasification of Husband’s Wife’s Schooling by Husband’s and Wife’s Race 
20 
 
Figure 1.1 Cross-Classification Visualized 
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Using simple tabular analyses, the Bernard study (1966) concludes that the 
majority of interracial marriages were educationally homogamous. This result is also 
found in Fu’s data. In Figure 1.1, most of the observations lie on the main diagonal for 
all sub-tables. This clearly shows a strong educational homogamous pattern for both 
intra-racial and interracial marriages. From Table 1.1, the percentage table of this 
cross-classification, 49.3% of couples in black-white marriage were on the main 
diagonal, indicating a strong tendency for spouses to match on their educational 
attainment. Similarly, the percentages of educational homogamy for other interracial 
marriages are large and all above 50% except for Mexican husband and white wife 
(49.6%, slightly lower than 50%). In the same race marriages, not surprisingly, the 
same pattern is observed: 52.9% for white-white marriages, 51.2% for black-black 
marriages, 52.8% for Mexican-Mexican marriages, and 60.5% for Japanese-Japanese 
marriages are educationally equal. For marriages involved with Japanese, a large 
portion of marriages are on the right lower corner of the tables and for marriages 
involved with the Mexicans, most are on the left upper corners, which indicate that on 
average, Japanese have higher educational level than Mexicans, and that the 
educational distribution for Japanese is skewed to the higher-end and that for 
Mexicans is skewed to the lower-end. When the intermarriages were not similar in 
educational levels, for example, in the black husband and white wife marriages, 26.6% 
of the marriages are with black husbands marrying down, whereas 24.2% of the 
couples have white wife marrying down.  
For intermarriage of white and Japanese Americans, the percentages are larger 
for Japanese marrying down (29.6% for Japanese husband marrying down compared 
to 14.2% of them marrying up in JW marriage; and 23.4% for Japanese wife marrying 
down compared to 19.1% of them marrying down). It seems to imply that Japanese 
spouse is more likely to marry down than his/her white partner. Recognizing the right-
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skewness of educational distribution for Japanese Americans, the existence of larger 
proportion of Japanese marrying whites with less educational levels is not surprising 
in intermarriage between Japanese Americans and whites. However, if we control for 
the marginal distribution of educational attainment for both whites and Japanese 
Americans, the difference between hypergamy and hypogamy in term of education 
will disappear (the QS model that controls for marginal distributions of educational 
attainment fits the JW and WJ tables well). Off the diagonal, the tendency for matches 
between husband education iHE and wife education jWE  is nearly equal to that for 
matches between j iHE and WE , but still shows some asymmetry. For example, for the 
BW subtable, 12n =1688 (5.9%), 21n =1425 (5.0%), 23n =3384 (11.9%), 32n =2094 
(7.3%), 34n =1430 (5.0%), and 43n =1072 (3.8%). However, the marginal distributions 
of husband and wife’s education have not been controlled for yet. When the disparity 
between the marginal distributions of educational distribution of husband and wife has 
been accounted for, we would expect a symmetry pattern in this table. Figure 1.1 does 
not control for the marginal distributions of husband’s and wife’s schooling either. 
The squares of off-diagonal cells seem to be symmetric along the main diagonal 
although there may still exist some differences between the area of those cells along 
the diagonal. Based on the fact that we have not controlled for the marginal 
distributions of spouses’ educational attainment and that the association seen from 
Figure 1.1 seems to be symmetric, we expect a quasi-symmetry model that would fit 










Selected Models for the BW Table 
 
Table 1.2 shows the fit of several loglinear models9 for marriages between 
black husbands and white wives. The independence model assumes that there is no 
association between husband’s education and wife’s education. Clearly, the 
independence model fits the data poorly here. I contrast the model of quasi-symmetry 
with that of symmetry, which posits equal frequencies in corresponding cells above 
and below the main diagonal of each education classification, HEWE HEWEij jiμ μ= . The 
symmetry model improves the fit significantly over that of the independence model, 
but still shows some lack of fit. The fit of the symmetry model, 2L =12.213 with df=6, 
shows that observed frequencies are asymmetric. It is then interesting to see whether 
this asymmetry can be accounted for by the quasi-symmetry model, where I allow for 
marginal distributions for husband’s and wife’s schooling to differ. From the excellent 
fit of quasi-symmetry ( 2L =3.456 with df=3, with asymptotic p-value 0.326 which well 
exceeds 0.05.), it shows that the data on BW marriages is consistent with the 
hypothesis of no status exchange. The ordinal quasi-symmetry model still shows lack 
of fit and uniform fits poorly for the BW subtable. So here the QS model fits the BW 
table pretty well and it suggests that there is no asymmetry of exchange between 
educational level of black husband and that of white wife.  
                                                 
9 Please see Appendix A for models detail. 
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Table 1.2 Goodness of Fit of Selected Models to Black Husband and White Wife Sub-
table 
Model df L2 p 
Independence 9 593.285 0 
Uniform 8 57.431 0 
Symmetry 6 12.213 0.057 
Quasi-independence 5 158.726 0 
Ordinal Quasi-symmetry 5 10.198 0.070 
Quasi-symmetry 3 3.456 0.326 
 
Table 1.3 reports the fitted log local odds ratios for BW table. Since the 
property ij jiθ θ= holds under quasi-symmetry, I only list estimated log local odds 
ratios in the upper triangle of the table.  
Table 1.3 Estimates, log ߠ෠௜௝, of Symmetric Local Associations under Quasi-Symmetry 
for Black Husband and White Wife Subtable 
i j 
1 2 3 
1 1.012 0.174 0.522 
2  1.176 0.660 




Now take a close look at the fitted log local odds ratios values. First, the 
relatively larger figures on the main diagonals (compared to the off diagonal) indicate 
a strong educational homogamy pattern and it is very difficult for persons to marry 
across the boundaries between adjacent educational categories. Since 
, , 1 , 1, 1
1, 1, 1 1, , 1
/ˆ
/
i i i i i i i i
ii
i i i i i i i i
μ μ μ μθ μ μ μ μ
+ + +
+ + + + +
⋅= = ⋅ , it actually describes the ratio of educational 
homogamous over the educational non-homogamous for the adjacent rows and 
columns of educational levels. For example, the fitted local odds ratio for high school 
diploma and some college is 22 3322
23 32
ˆ μ μθ μ μ
⋅= ⋅  =exp (1.176) = 3.241, which states that 
the odds of a person marries someone with a high school education relative to 
someone with some college is 3.241 times higher if the person has a high school 
education than if they have some college. The bigger the ratio is, the more likely 
people marry within their own educational category and the more difficult for people 
to marry across the educational levels. Clearly, 33ˆ exp(1.734) 5.66θ = =  is the biggest, 
indicating that the boundary between some college and college degree (and above) is 
the most difficult for people to cross in terms of one categorical distance. 33 22ˆ ˆθ θ>  
indicates that the boundary between some college and college degree (and above) is 
more difficult for a person with some college to cross than the boundary between 
some college and high school diploma. This is consistent with the finding that groups 
at the top of the educational hierarchy are more closed than groups in the middle 
(Uunk et al 1996; Hendrick 1994 cited in Kalmijn 1998). The biggest of 33θˆ  indicates 
that the strongest boundary is that between college graduates and lesser educated 
persons. One explanation for this strongest boundary is that college functions as local 
marriage markets that are physically separated from settings in which lesser-educated 
persons are involved. Also people marry later and spend more time in school. The 
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time between leaving school and marriage has narrowed. More likely unmarried 
people, especially the college educated, meet their spouse in school.  
The positive parameters indicate that the further apart the couples’ educational 
attainments, the less likely the marriage. For example, the odds ratio of less than high 
school diploma and college (and above) is simply the exponential of the sum of the 








= =∑ . It indicates that the odds of a black male 
marries a white partner with less than high school diploma relative to a white partner 
with college degree is nearly 761 higher if the black male has a less than high school 
education than if he has college degree.  
 
Extension to Other Racial Combinations 
I then fit the QS model to the white husband and black wife marriage (WB). 
The excellent fit of QS ( 2L =1.495 with df=3) for WB table also strongly suggests that 
there is no exchange in the marriage of white husband and black wife. The excellent 
fit of the QS model for both BW and WB tables indicates that BW and WB follow the 
same educational association pattern, which is quasi-symmetry in character. This 
clearly suggests that there is no status exchange among white and black intermarriage.  
Actually, I also fit the QS model to other racial combinations (the same-race 
marriage and the mixed-race marriage between whites and Mexican Americans as well 
as between whites and Japanese Americans) and find that the QS model fits the data 
pretty well except for WW table. For WW table, QS model has a residual deviance of 
141 with 3 degrees of freedom. It shows a statistically significant lack of fit. However, 
the lack of fit here might be due to the large sample size since it is difficult to find 
models that fit the data according to conventional probability levels.  
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Table 1.4 presents the observed vs. the fitted counts under QS model for the 
white-white marriages.  
Table 1.4 Observed V.S. Fitted Frequencies for WW Marriage 
Observed  Fitted 
21,802 22,939 9,175 1,171
 
21,802 22,966 9,261 1,058
19,008 90,470 43,631 9,076 18,981 90,470 44,199 8,535
6,742 39,008 66,462 20,214 6,656 38,440 66,462 20,868
913 9464 28,780 56,897 1,026 10,005 28,126 56,897
 
Under the quasi-symmetry, the main diagonals of the WW subtable are fitted 
perfectly, which can be easily seen in Table 1.4. Off the diagonals, the fitted values 
deviate slightly from the observed frequencies.  
Assess Lack-of-Fit in WW marriages: Statistical but Not Practical 
To assess whether it is actually practically lack of fit, I will use dissimilarity 
index (Agresti 2002)(p329-330). Dissimilarity index, also called index of dissimilarity 
or referred to as “Delta” ( Δˆ ), evaluates the lack of fit by estimating the smallest 
fraction of the population under study that would need to move to different cells in 
order for the model to fit perfectly. The statistic is calculated from model residuals and 
can be taken as a direct interpretation of the magnitude of departures from the model 
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with smaller values representing a better fit ( ˆ0 1<= Δ <= ). It has been widely used in 
social science as a supplement to the model selection criteria such as those based on 
the log likelihood. I calculate the Delta under quasi-symmetry model for white-white 
marriages, which is 0.0045 here. Agresti (2002, p329) argues that when delta<0.02 or 
0.03, the sample data follow the model pattern quite closely, even though the model is 
not perfect. Though the relatively large 2L value for white-white marriages indicated 
that the QS model does not truly hold, the small Delta value suggests that, in a 
practical sense, it fits decently. The reasonably fit of the QS model to each racial 
combination implies no status exchange.  
 
Variations on Quasi-symmetry 
Simply adding the quasi-symmetry fitting for each racial combination, I get the 
unrestricted quasi-symmetry (UQS) model. By looking at the estimated log local odds 
ratios10 for each racial combination under quasi-symmetry, I find values of these 
parameters are quite close for all these sub-tables. Then I try to fit uniform quasi-
symmetry (UniQS) model to all the tables by the additional restriction that all the 
educational association parameters are the same in each racial combination, which 
results a fit of 2L = 374.37 with 84 degrees of freedom. This suggests the UniQS 
model for all the subtables shows some lack of fit. Thinking that the statistical lack-of-
fit might be skewed barely by the large sample size of white-white marriages, I fit 
separate UniQS models for the mixed-race marriages and the same-race marriages 
excluding whites. The excellent fit (for the-same race marriages excluding whites, the 
fit is 2L =29.18 with df=21; for the mixed-race marriages, 2L =50.327 with df=48) 
strongly suggests that the same-race and mixed-race marriages share a broadly similar 
                                                 
10 Upon request, the author will provide the log local odds ratios for each sub-table.  
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pattern of educational homogamy, which is quasi-symmetric in character. In addition, 
the closeness of the fitted log local odds ratios of UniQS models for different racial 
combinations (see Table 1.5) strongly indicates that there is a remarkable consistency 
and symmetry in husband/wife educational attainment regardless of race (with the 
possible exception of white/white marriages); intermarried couples share a similar 
level of education, and educational homogamy dominates the educational marriages, 
no matter how strong the racial endogamy is. 
Table 1.5 presents the log local odds ratios for the uniform quasi-symmetry 
models for different racial combinations.  





1 2 3 
White-White 
1 1.510 0.192 0.524
2  1.264 0.486
3   1.863
Same-Race(no 
WW) 
1 1.504 -0.054 0.379
2  1.452 0.350
3   1.722
Mixed-Race 
1 1.206 0.153 0.321
2  1.247 0.540






Based on the above analysis, we claim that the same-race and mixed-race 
marriage share a broadly similar pattern of educational homogamy, which is quasi-
symmetric in character; and that there is little, if any, evidence for the status exchange 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the evidence strongly indicates that there is a remarkable 
consistency and symmetry in husband/wife educational attainment regardless of race 
(white/white marriages may be slightly exceptional).  
Here I am not denying race as a salient social distinction that people make in 
their marriage choices since spouses disproportionately often belong to the same race, 
but that educational homogamy is strong enough for couples to cross the racial line 
and that intermarried couples share a similar level of education, and educational 
homogamy dominates the educational marriages, no matter how strong the racial 
endogamy is. In fact, most exchange theorists also do not deny the importance of 
status homogamy (Elder 1969; Goode 1951). 
Is Education a Valid Indicator?  
Educational attainment affects marital choice in terms of both opportunity and 
preference. Educational institutions provide settings for intergroup interaction, and 
educational attainment is believed to have an effect on values, attitudes, knowledge, 
and life-styles of an individual (Kalmijn and Flap 2001). The prominence of 
educational homogamy increases in terms of preference and opportunities over time. 
First, due to the rapid increases in educational attainment in all populations, people’s 
values, norms, and life-styles are more likely at later dates to be formed by common 
experiences in educational institutions (Kalmijn 1991; Kalmijn 1991; Kalmijn and 
Flap 2001). Second, the opportunities for matching on education have increased due to 
the prolonged numbers of years spent in educational institutions (Mare 1991). 
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Conclusions and Possible Future Research  
In this paper, I have reexamined Fu’s data, which supposedly support status 
exchange according to his preferred models. Using the simple QS model and its 
variations, I show that they actually support no status exchange.  
In addition, I have disputed Rosenfeld’s claim that simple tabular analysis has 
been marginalized because of their simplicity by identifying a complex model, the QS 
model, which indeed supports no status exchange hypothesis rather than status 
exchange. The apparent contradiction is not real and the contradictory results are 
really due to the insistence on interpreting models that are not consistent with the data. 
Loglinear models (the QS models and its variations) that are consistent with the data 
clearly suggest status exchange is a myth.  
Furthermore, I have proposed a new model that better explains the educational 
pattern in intermarriage. The QS model and its variations bear the natural base for “no 
status exchange” hypothesis and they are consistent with the data.  
The present research suggests several possible future studies. One study could 
investigate whether the status exchange hypothesis holds true in early 1940s when the 
racial boundary is exceptionally strong and also investigate whether it holds true in 
2000 census data. Perhaps in the era of Merton (1941) and Davis (1941), minority 
people did compensate their social status for the racial status in interracial marriage. If 
the status exchange hypothesis did hold true when the group boundary was strong and 
it is not the case for the more recent data set, it might indicate the weakening of group 
boundaries in race lines. If the status exchange hypothesis receives no empirical 
support from the early data set, the justification of its continued use will be 
questioned. It might also be interesting to explore how the educational association 
pattern changes over time and how the educational combination in local marriage 





An I I×  table satisfies symmetry when ,ij ji i jπ π= ≠ . This has the loglinear 
model 
                 ,log ij i j ijμ λ λ λ λ= + + +                    (A.1) 
where all ij jiλ λ= . In this model, the main-effect terms are the same for the two 
expected frequencies ij jiμ μ= , and marginal homogeneity occurs. As most believed, 
the symmetry model rarely fits well, especially when the marginal distributions differ 
substantially. 
The quasi-symmetry model is less restrictive than the symmetry model. It 
allows the main-effect terms in the symmetry model differ. I define quasi-symmetry 
model by 
               
log ,R Cij i j ijμ λ λ λ λ= + + +                        (A.2) 
where ij jiλ λ=  for all i<j with the residual df =(I-1)(I-2)/2 (Caussinus 1966). 
 
Agresti (2002, p. 425) also defines the following properties or conditions for 
quasi-symmetry to hold:  
 ij II ji II
iI Ib jI Ia
for all i j
μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ= <                       (A.3) 
or   ,ij jiθ θ=                                               (A.4) 
that is, the odds ratios on one side of the main diagonal are identical to corresponding 
odds ratios on the other side.  
When 1,...,R Ci i for i Iλ λ= = , it becomes the usual model of symmetry, and 
when all ijλ =0, it’s the independence model. Caussinus’s (1966) showed that 
symmetry is equivalent to quasi-symmetry and marginal homogeneity holding 
simultaneously, thus 




Special cases of quasi-symmetry: 
Quasi-independence  
Quasi-independence is the special case of quasi-symmetry when { }ij for i jλ ≠  
are identical, and when I=3, they are equivalent (Caussinus, 1966). It has a perfect fit 
on the main diagonal, but independence holds for the off-diagonals. Usually this 
model would be used for tables that should independence on the off-diagonal cells, but 
had large counts on the main diagonal. 








=⎧= = ⎨ ≠⎩  
Ordinal Quasi-symmetry Model 
When categories are ordered, I can fit a more parsimonious model. Let 
1 ... Iu u≤ ≤  denote ordered scores for both the row and columns. An ordinal quasi-
symmetry model is 
 log ,ij i j j ijuμ λ λ λ β λ= + + + +   (A.7) 
where ij ji for all i jλ λ= < . It is the special case of the quasi-symmetry model in 
which C Rj j juλ λ β− =  has a linear trend. When β =0, it becomes symmetry model. 
 
Quasi-uniform association (Goodman 1979a) 
 log ( )R Cij i j i j iu u I i jμ λ λ λ β δ= + + + + =  (A.8) 
permits linear-by-linear association off the main diagonal. When scores are 






Rosenfeld (2005) has visualized the black-white intermarriage pattern; 
however, he did not include in his figure the strength of intermarriage in term of 
educational level. So here Figure 1.2 shows educational patterns in black-white 
marriages, which has also taken advantage of Gullickson’s (2004)’s visualizations. 
The thick solid lines inside the box represent median educational level. The dark 
arrows between the two groups represent educational homogamy with upper arrows 
thicker than the lower ones, which indicates the greater propensity for blacks and 
whites at higher educational levels to form interracial marriages; while downward 
sloping dashed arrow indicates status exchange. 
Figure 1.2 Educational Patterns in Black-White Intermarriage 
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As Rosenfeld (2005) has argued, in the climate of inequality between whites 
and blacks, homogamy can be mistaken for exchange because of the incomplete 
information about the interracial couples due to the taboo of intermarriage and social 
distances between blacks and whites (See also Rosenfeld 2005). For example, in 
Figure 1.2, the second solid line between the black and white groups represents an 
educationally homogamous marriage. So in this intermarriage, both spouses have the 
same socioeconomic level. However, from the view of “lower status” blacks, people 
with relative higher SES marrying out (it’s above the median educational level); while 
from whites’ perspective, people with relative lower SES (below the median of white 
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CHAPTER 2 PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA: A GAME 
THEORY EXPLANATION OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “RED HAT” 
Introduction 
The structure of the Chinese economy has changed significantly since the 
1980s with the emergence of private enterprises. “Capitalism” as an economic order 
was dismantled with China’s thorough-going socialist transformation of industry and 
commerce by the mid-1950s. A private enterprise economy was restored only in recent 
decades in response to increasing concern about urban unemployment and economic 
stagnation following the Cultural Revolution. The rebirth and development of the 
private enterprise economy in China followed evolutionary bottom-up dynamics 
linked to China’s transition to a market economy (Zhang, 1993). China’s success in its 
economic transition and fast growth has attracted much research interest (Tsui etc. 
2004; Nee 1989, 1992; Walder and Oi 1999). It has made China the natural laboratory 
to test and challenge various conventional theories, such as the theories of the firm and 
property, and those of institutional development (Boisot and Child, 1996; Cao, Qian, 
and Weingast, 1995; Megginson and Netter, 2001). Among the most puzzling aspects 
of China’s economic development is the phenomenon of an innovative ownership 
form of firms—local government ownership in general and rural Township-Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) in particular, which are neither privately nor state owned. As a 
matter of fact, we have observed thousands of private enterprises choosing to register 
as collective firms—guakao or as it were “wearing a red hat”. The unique ownership 
practices and TVEs were China’s growth engine until the mid-1990s. Under 
conventional property rights theories, the existence of well-defined private property 
rights is an essential precondition to the proper functioning of a market economy 
(Coase, 1992; North 1997), and unclear property rights theoretically ought to result in 
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such enterprises operating comparatively inefficiently and ultimately being forced out 
of the market (Demsetz 1967).  
The success of these fake collective enterprises has created a puzzle: why are 
there so many fake collective enterprises, and why have they been successful under 
such unclear property rights? Many scholars have provided various efficiency 
explanations (Chang and Wang, 1994; Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Li 1996; Che and 
Qian 1998; Bai, Li, and Wang 2001). Following Grossman and Hart (1986), Chang 
and Wang (1994) study the ownership structure of the TVEs examining residual 
control rights as well as residual benefit rights. They conclude that the TVEs are 
controlled by the township-village government (TVG), and explain TVEs as the 
second-best political solution. Weitzman and Xu (1994) provide a cultural explanation 
of TVEs using a fundamental concept of repeated game theory to integrate China’s 
cultural element of a cooperative spirit (China has been dominated by the values of 
collectivism and family) with standard property rights theories. Some studies explain 
TVEs as the second-best ownership solution, and argue that such non-standard 
ownership forms work to improve efficiency in an adverse environment characterized 
by insecure private property rights (International Finance Corporation, 2000; Li 1996; 
Che and Qian 1998; Qian 2003). Others explain TVEs with transaction cost theory 
(Nee 1992; Oi 1999; Tian 2000). Nee (1992) has begun to address the issues of the 
rational choice made by economic actors in China’s present institutional environment. 
He argues that TVEs serve as a hybrid form in the context of underdeveloped formal 
institutions of law and market, and also that the informal institution of guanxi would 
have a lower agency cost than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and lower transaction 
costs than private firms. Tsai (2006; 2007) contends that the red hat strategy is an 
example of how an adaptive informal institution contributed to institutional conversion 
of a formal regulation during the first decade of economic reform. These explanations 
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have recognized the significance of institutional change and the direct or indirect 
involvement of local government in the activities of TVEs.  
In this paper, I will employ a game theory framework to explain the rational 
behavior of entrepreneurs and local government under the transitional institutions, and 
consider how these actors play the extensive games with perfect information. The 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the red hat phenomenon. Section 3 
presents the game. Then I interpret the evolution of the red hat phenomenon in Section 
4, and provide concluding discussion in Section 5. 
The “Red Hat” phenomenon 
“Wearing a red hat” portrays a phenomenon in which enterprises invested in 
and run by individuals have an operational license registered under collective 
ownership (Kueh, 1985) and pay the attached collective units a certain sum of money 
as overhead expenses (a “management fee” or “administrative fee”). Indeed, during 
the initial period of development of the private economy, in particular before the State 
Council issued the so-called Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises (TSPE) to 
govern the registration and management of private firms, wearing a red hat exerted a 
certain positive effect on the development of private enterprises due to the unequal 
treatment received by private enterprises in comparison with their state-owned 
counterparts. Before the Private Enterprise Law was enacted in 1988, private 
enterprises with more than eight employees were not legally permitted. In addition, 
private firms were often subjected to public criticism and arbitrary treatment and 
harassment by bureaucrats such as tax collectors. The red-hat wearers have to turn in a 
certain sum of money as overhead expenses, relinquish some authority regarding 
decision-making, and lose some opportunities in market competition; however, the 
protection provided by the red hat can exempt them from suffering many troubles, 
and, moreover, can supply them with many material benefits such as tax breaks, bank 
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loans, and use of land similar to those received by state and collectively owned 
enterprises. Consequently, it is no wonder that the administration failed repeatedly in 
its efforts to ban the “red-hat wearing” phenomenon. 
According to statistics provided by the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce of China, in 1987 about fifty thousand enterprises across the country with a 
collective name were actually private ones, accounting for about 22.2% of the total 
number of private enterprises in China (Shaoxiang Qin, Ting Jia, 1993). In 1989, a 
sample survey of more than two thousand enterprises conducted in Chongqing showed 
that 92% of them were private enterprises but registered as non-private ones. Further, 
80% of private enterprises exist under the name of township enterprises, neighborhood 
enterprises, enterprises administered by civil administration, school-run workshops, 
etc., through pseudo-contracts, pseudo-transfers and pseudo-joint-ventures (Yearbook 
on Private Economy of China, 1994). From January to April, 1991, among the 286 
private enterprises that disappeared from the registry in the Baoding area of Hebei 
Province, 65 changed their ownership nature (two of them became state-owned 
enterprises, and the remaining 63 became collective enterprises), accounting for 22.7% 
of the total (Houyi Zhang, 1993). 
However, there now is a move to take off the red hat throughout the country. 
For example, since the convening of the 15th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China in September 1997, in Wujin city of Jiangsu Province alone, there have 
been 1081 enterprises that have taken off the red hat; over 260 in Qingdao within the 
initial two months of 1995; 6000 in Zhejiang Province by the end of October of 1997; 
and over 1000 in Shanghai by the end of 1998. Similar trends can be observed in many 
other cities. Nonetheless, there still exist more than three million “pseudo-collectives” 
throughout the country (Zhang and Wang 1999).  
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A Simple Extensive Game with Perfect Information 
Model Setup and Solutions 
This game concerns the interaction of local government and the private sector. 
The central government will be considered as the institutional environment, and is 
assumed to be a benevolent social planner (Libecap 1989). There are two sets of 
players: the local government and the private enterprises. First, we start with a simple 
game with only one private enterprise, F1, which may choose to register as private or 
as a collective by attaching to the local government, G; the local government may 
accept or reject this proposal. Then we will bring in more private enterprises as 
players.  
The game is as follows. Firm F1 has two choices: propose to the local 
government G and register as collective, or not propose and register as private. If it 
proposes, the local government G may either accept or reject. We may model this 
situation as an extensive game with perfect information in which the terminal histories 
are (Propose, Accept), (Propose, Reject), and Not Propose, and in which the player 
function assigns firm F1 to the start of the game and the local government G to the 
history Propose. We assume all players are rational in the sense that they have precise 
information about what will occur under any choice made, that they have the ability to 
compare every choice against every other choice, and that they are fully aware of all 
possible choices. We also assume that all players have perfect information of other 
players; that is, all players have complete knowledge about the actions and payoffs of 
other players.  
The model’s sequence of play is shown in Figure 2.1. F1 moves first and must 
choose whether to propose to G. Once F1 has chosen propose, G chooses to accept or 
reject. The payoffs from this game are also given in Figure 2.1. In reality, the payoffs 
are more complicated, and the payoff function or utility function can be defined by 
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real factors such as resources from the market and the planned economy, which I will 
discuss later.  
 
Note: Firm 1’s payoffs are the first number in each pair. 
In the game shown in Figure 2.1, it seems clear that Firm 1 will propose to the 
local government G and the government G will subsequently accept the offer. Firm 1 
would use backward induction1 and reason that if it proposes then G will accept, 
because doing so is better for G than rejecting (payoff for G to accept is 3 instead of 1 
to reject). Given that G will respond to the proposal in this way, Firm 1 is better off 
proposing (5 compared to 3 for not proposing). 
Equivalently, the extensive game could be described in a strategic form. A 
player’s strategy specifies the action the player chooses for every history after which it 
is his turn to move. In the game in Figure 2.1, Firm 1 has two strategies, Propose and 
Not Propose, and the local government G has two strategies, Accept or Reject. The 
strategic form of the game is shown in Table 1.1. We see that it has two Nash 
equilibria: (Propose, Accept) and (Not Propose, Reject). The first equilibrium is the 
                                                 
1 This line of argument is as follows. When a player has to move, he deduces, for each of his possible 
actions, the actions that the players (including himself) will subsequently rationally take, and chooses 
the action that will yield the terminal history he most prefers.  
Figure 2.1 The extensive game of Firm1 and Local Government G 
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pattern of behavior isolated by backward induction discussed above. In the second 
equilibrium Firm 1 always chooses Not Propose. This strategy is optimal given the 
local government G’s strategy to reject in the event of proposal. Further, G’s strategy 
Reject is optimal given Firm 1’s strategy: Firm 1 chooses Not Propose, so whether the 
local government G plans to choose Accept or Reject makes no difference to its 
payoff. Thus neither player can increase its payoff by choosing a different strategy, 
given the other player’s strategy. 
Table 2.1 The Strategic Form of the Extensive Game in Figure 2.1 
  Government G 
  Accept Reject 
Firm 1 
Propose 5, 3 1, 1 
Not Propose 3, 1 3, 1 
However, the second equilibrium is not robust. In the strategic game, whenever 
F1 plays the game, it observes G’s action, even if it chooses Not Propose; however, in 
the extensive game, when F1 chooses Not Propose, he or she never observes G’s 
action because G never moves. In a strategic game, the rationale for the Nash 
equilibrium condition that each player’s strategy be optimal given the other players’ 
strategies is that in a steady state, each player’s experience playing the game results in 
his beliefs about the other players’ actions to be correct. This rationale does not apply 
to the Nash equilibrium (Not Propose, Reject), because F1 who always chooses Not 
Propose never observes G’s action after the history Propose. We could interpret a 
Nash equilibrium of an extensive game by considering a slightly perturbed steady state 
in which, on rare occasions, non-equilibrium actions are taken (perhaps players make 
mistakes), and the perturbations allow each player eventually to observe every other 
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player’s action after every history. However, on those rare occasions when F1 wears a 
red hat, the subsequent behavior of G to reject is not a steady state in the remainder of 
the game: if F1 enters, G is better off accepting than rejecting. That is, the Nash 
equilibrium does not correspond to a robust steady state of the extensive game, 
because the notion of Nash equilibrium ignores the sequential structure of an extensive 
game; it treats strategies as choices made once and for all before play begins.  
Subgame perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium that corresponds to a perturbed 
steady state in which every history sometimes occurs; the players’ behavior must 
correspond to a steady state in every subgame, not only in the whole game. The first 
Nash equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium2, while the second is not. In Figure 
2.2, we have listed all the subgames of the game in Figure 2.1, and (Propose, Accept) 
is a subgame perfect equilibrium.  
 
 
So we have our two propositions to the game in Figure 2.2.  
                                                 
2 Every subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. 
Figure 2.2 The Two Proper Subgames of the Extensive Game in Figure 2.1 
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Prop.1 If F1 believes that the local Government will commit to Reject for sure, 
based on payoffs of the game in Figure 2.1, he would choose the second Nash 
equilibrium, that is, (Not Propose, Reject).  
Prop.2 Unless F1 has the belief that the local Government G will commit to 
Reject for sure, based on payoffs of the game in Figure 2.1, he would choose the Nash 
equilibrium which is also a subgame perfect equilibrium, that is, (Propose, Accept).  
For now, there are only two players, firm F1 and government G. We could 
extend this model to bring in more firms. For example, in time period 1, firm F1 could 
propose or not to propose to the local government G; in period 2, firm F2 could play 
the same game with government G; then in period 3, firm F3, etc. In addition, some of 
the firms could also choose to propose to G simultaneously.  
This simple model could also be used to describe the interaction of red hat 
wearers and the local government when they think about taking off the hat as shown in 
Figure 2.3. The red hat wearer could either propose an offer to the local government 
for taking off the hat or simply stay with the hat on. The local government has the 
choice of whether to accept or reject this offer.  
Note: H1’s payoffs are the first number in each pair. 
Figure 2.3 The Extensive and Strategic Form of a Game between Hat Wearers and the 
Local Government G. 
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The previous propositions are based on the payoffs of the game in Figure 2.1. 
By empirical research, such as case studies, we could obtain the payoffs of the two 
players and accordingly get the best response actions for each of the players. In 
addition, although we could not have the exact payoff functions, we could still have a 
sense of how much the payoffs are. For example, in reality, we do not know the exact 
payoff function of F1, but we do know that the payoff might be related to market 
resources and planned resources, legal protections, taxes, etc.  
For simplicity, we could assume that the utility of F and G are (0, 0) when F 
chooses not to wear the red hat and (-C, 0) when F proposes to wear the hat and 
Government G rejects, where C is the one time cost associated with F proposing to G. 
Then the utility (μf, μg) is simply the extra gains from wearing the red hat for the 
pseudo-private firm F and the local government G if G accepts (shown in Figure 2.4).  
 
Note: H1’s payoffs are the first number in each pair. 
 
Assumption 1 The Firm F’s utility function μf (rp, rm, h, t, d) is continuously 





















Figure 2.4 The Extensive and Strategic Form of a Game between Hat Wearers and the 
Local Government G. 
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Assumption 1A implies that the utility of F is positively related to the resource 
that is redistributed in the planned economy. Assumption 1B implies that the utility of 
F is negatively related to the resource that is available in the market; that is, the 
more resources the firm can get from the market, the more payoffs it will get. To 
incorporate more firms into this framework, we assume that the resource that is 
available to firm F is a function of the number (n) of firms who wear red hats and that 
decreases as n increases. Assumptions 1C and 1D demonstrates that the utility of F 
will decrease as the overhead expenses h paid to the government increases and the tax 
rate t increases. Assumption 1E states that the more decision making authority the firm 
has to relinquish to the local government G, the less utility it will get.  
Assumption 2 The local government G’s utility function μfg (rp, rm, h, t’, d, e) 


























gμ (2F).  
Here t’ is the tax base that the local government keeps from the central 
government. Assumption 2F states that the local government values the employment 
rate and the higher rate e is the higher utility it will get.  
According to these two assumptions, in the early stages of market transition, 
the gain of switching to collective firms from private firms is huge because of the 
access to more resources provided by the planned economy. However, with more and 
more firms wearing a red hat, the resources accessible by each red hat wearer become 
smaller in the planned economy and the total proportion of resources in the planned 
economy becomes smaller and smaller with the development of the market. 





early stage of market reform. Then, more and more red hat wearers would take off 
their hats, and fewer and fewer private firms register under the collective ownership in 
the first place as the reform proceeds. In reality the phenomena of the red hat follows 
this pattern.  
In the following section, I will use a case to illustrate the model here, and 
employ the game model to explore the behavior of private entrepreneurs and the local 
government in the transitional institution. That is, I will attempt to explain why some 
of the private firms choose to register as collectives by paying an “administration fee” 
to a state or collective unit or local government organization, and why some red hat 
wearers choose to take off the hat and reveal their true ownership.  
 
The Rise and Fall of the Red Hat Firms 
Institutional Environment 
Before proceeding to the case, I first will briefly introduce the unique context 
of Chinese transitional institutions.  
1. A Dual Track Approach  
There are two track systems in China—the plan track and the market track. 
The two tracks follow different principles. Under the plan track, resources are 
allocated according to a pre-existing detailed plan. All of the related economic 
activities are regulated by the plan. For example, the quantities of goods that an 
enterprise will produce and the prices it will charge for the goods are all specified in 
the plan (administrative prices). Meanwhile, firms operating under the market track 
will follow market laws. Due to this dual track approach, some material is not 
available in the market track and even if it is, the prices are cheaper in the planned 
economy. According to Qian (2003), the dual track approach improves efficiency, 
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protects the interests of former interest groups, and makes the best use of existing 
institutions3.  
2. Fiscal System Reform4 
Before 1978, the fiscal system in China was highly centralized, and all 
revenues belonged to the central government through the practices of the revenue-
sharing system. With the implementation of market reforms, the traditional tax base of 
the planned economy such as SOE profits and revenue collection declined steeply. In 
1998, the central government introduced fiscal contracts with local governments (the 
“fiscal responsibility system”), in which a lump-sum subsidy to the center from each 
province was stipulated and then increased annually by an agreed upon rate, with any 
additional revenues accruing to the province; provinces use the retained revenues to 
meet their expenditure needs. However, revenues continued to decline due to the 
problems of SOE profitability and persistent credibility problems of the central 
government (Wong, Heady and Woo 1995). In contrast, the off-budget funds, also 
known as “extra-extra budgetary funds” or “little money lockers” grew during the 
1980s and 1990s, although the magnitude is unknown (Wong and Bird 2005). These 
off-budget funds are widespread among township governments and villages; profits 
and contributions from local enterprises are the major source of these. Under this 
fiscal system, local governments in China were motivated to control local private 
enterprises to secure their own little money lockers (Wu 2003). The 1994 fiscal reform 
aimed to “recentralize” the fiscal system with three components: tax sharing, tax 
modernization, and tax administration (Bahl 1999).  
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion of the dual track approach, please refer to Qian (2003) . 
4 Refer to Wong and Bird (2005) for a detailed discussion of China’s fiscal reform.  
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3. Laws and Regulations 
A. The First Stage (1977-1988) 
During the initial period of development of the private economy, in particular 
before the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises (TSPE) was issued in June, 
1988, the legitimacy of private enterprises had not been acknowledged by the 
government. The private sector was limited to individual businesses (getihu), which 
first developed in a regulatory vacuum, except that a July 1981 government document 
had capped the number of employees a getihu could hire at eight. In 1983, China 
introduced a series of central and local regulations for the licensing and control of 
individual businesses, which pertained to issues such as taxation, product quality and 
hygiene, and free markets. Followed by inspection drives, “market rectification” 
drives became an opportunity to attack private business. The private economy was 
introduced into the socialist planned economy as a “supplement” (CCP Central 
Committee 1984). Private enterprises were not officially registered as a category until 
June 1988.  
B. The Second Stage (1988-1997) 
In 1988, TSPE was implemented. Under TSPE, siyingqiye (private 
enterprises), were distinguished from the smaller getihu (individual enterprise), and 
were defined as “a for-profit organization that is owned by individuals and employs 
more than eight people”. A State Council regulation regarding the lease contract of 
small State-owned enterprises was issued in May 19885. The adoption of these lease 
contracts introduced private entrepreneurs into the management of SOEs, because 
mangers could be recruited outside of the SOE. This led to the privatization of many 
                                                 
5 Tentative Regulations on the Lease of Small State-owned Industrial Enterprises, The State Council 
May 20, 1988. 
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township and village enterprises (TVEs). Another important change was introduced in 
the Chinese constitution in 1988, amendment of the 11th article which stated: “The 
state permits the existence and development of the private economy under law. The 
private sector is the complement of the public economy. The state protects the legal 
rights and interests of the private economy….” (Mao 1998). In 1993, “Proposals on 
Promoting the Development of Individual and Private Enterprises” and the Company 
Law were released. 
C. The Third Stage (1997-present) 
In 1997, the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly 
stated in its congress report that the private economy is a “significant component of 
our socialist market economy.” This philosophy was reaffirmed in the 1999 revision of 
the Constitution: “the non-public sectors such as individual and private sectors of the 
economy constitute an important component of the socialist market economy; the state 
protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy such 
as individual and private sectors; the state conducts leading, supervision and 
management of this sector” (NPC 1999). On May 12th, 1997, the State Administration 
of Industry and Commerce enacted “The Notice on Problems Concerning Strict 
Checking and Ratifying of the Economic Nature of Enterprises”, which clearly 
stipulates the operational specifications for re-ratifying the enterprises’ economic 
nature in order to protect the development of the public economy and the legitimate 
rights of investors. In March 1998, the government issued a directive requiring all the 
red hat firms to take off the hat by November 1998.  
The non-public economy is clearly defined in a Constitutional amendment of 
March 1999 as being elevated from “complementary status” to “a significant 
component of our socialist market economy”. This has had a significant impact on 
private enterprises in China. After the second revision of the Constitution, large 
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private enterprises have been permitted to be listed on the stock market; private 
enterprises also are able to participate in the transformation of state-owned and 
collective enterprises through joint investment, share holding, or purchase.  
In addition, the policy makers have made significant changes to accommodate 
the rise of private business interests and to formally protect private property rights. In 
November 2002, the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of China explicitly 
proposed to “improve the legal system to protect private property rights.” Further, in 
March 2004, the National People's Congress (NPC) amended China's constitution in 
order to stipulate that citizens' lawful private property is inviolable, thereby placing 
private assets on an equal footing with public property. This signifies a significant 
departure from previously believed central principles that private ownership is 
contrary to the common interest.  
Great changes also occurred to the modes through which social resources were 
allocated. As the country’s capability for allocating and controlling resources through 
the planned system weakened, markets began to play an increasingly stronger role in 
resource allocation, leading to an increase both in the free-floating resources in society 
and in the equal competition factor of the market. Currently, the Chinese government 
is establishing through legislation an equal civil treatment between state-owned, 
collective, and private enterprises. For example, on September 2nd, 1998, the State 
Council approved the adoption of the “Interim Provisions on Granting Private 
Manufacturers and Academies of Scientific Research the Self-Managed Import and 
Export Right”. On January 5th, 1999, twenty private manufacturers, including the 
XiWang Group, were the first to be granted the self-managed Import and Export right 
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation.  
Figure 2.5 shows the number of employed persons in township enterprises 
from 1978 to 2002 by ownership structure. At year 1989, after private firms were first 
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officially recognized in 1988, China had over 8.8 million persons employed in private 
firms in contrast to 47.2 million employed in collective-owned firms (as discussed 
previously, many large private firms disguised themselves as collective firms by 
wearing a red hat). The political events of 1989 caused a temporary setback to the 
growth of private enterprises in 1990 and 1991 with a declining number of persons 
employed in private firms and an increasing number employed in collective firms. 
Then Deng Xiaoping’s famous “Southern Tour” in late 1992 called for a continuation 
of the reform and deepening of the transition to the market economy, which has 
renewed the growth in private sectors in the following years. With the development of 
the market transition, pseudo-collective firms chose to reveal their true identities by 
taking off their red hats and becoming private firms. This is shown in Figure 2.5 as 
substantial increases were found in employment in the private sector, in contrast to the 
corresponding decreases in the collective sector after 1995 (two years after the release 
of the Company Law in 1993). Similar patterns were found in the registered number of 
private firms versus collective-owned firms among Township enterprises (shown in 
Figure 2.6)  
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Source: China State Statistical Yearbook 2003, p448 
 
Figure 2.5 Employed Persons of Township Enterprises, by Ownership and Year 
61 
 
Source: China State Statistical Yearbook 2003, p447. 
 
A Game Theoretical Explanation of the Rise and Fall of the Red Hat 
Case One6:  
Mr. Song, a farmer of Chengguan Town, Sanhe County… sold his Liberation-
brand automobile in 1986 and began to operate two diesel trucks. By the end of the 
same year, he changed his business to run a slaughtering and meat processing plant 
and stopped the hauling trade. The slaughtering and meat processing plant was put 
into formal production on January 20th, 1987. After the slaughtering and meat 
processing plant was set up, Mr. Song bought a microbus, refrigerator car, etc. So far, 
his total fixed assets were valued at 520,000 yuan, and current assets totaled 240,000 
                                                 
6 This case is translated from Qin and Ting, 1993, Exploring the new social group, China Development 
Press, Beijing, p.102-103 
Figure 2.6 Number of Collective-owned and Private-owned Firms, by Year 
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yuan. He had a 340,000 yuan loan from the bank, and sixty tons of fresh meat stock in 
the county’s refrigerator. He had a store in front of the plant and another store on a 
market street of the county. The output in 1987 was worth one million yuan, with 
150,000 as profit and over 30,000 paid as tax. The “Gucheng Slaughtering and Meat 
Processing Plant” run by Song is a private enterprise, but its operation license is in the 
name of joint management by the Nanguan village committee and the county’s supply 
and marketing agency. The Nanguan village committee did not render any support for 
the slaughtering and meat processing plant, nor a penny of investment. However, the 
committee took away from Song several thousand yuan each year only because they 
lent the plant their name. The county’s supplying and marketing agency only provided 
the plant with a 20,0000 yuan loan, which must be returned by the time due, while the 
slaughtering and meat processing plant in turn gave them six thousand yuan as 
dividends. It is stipulated in the contract that Mr. Song is the corporate representative 
of the plant and is in full charge of all the operation and management of the plant, with 
which Nanguan Village and the supplying and marketing agency should not interfere. 
By attaching to collective units, Song’s private business enjoyed rapid growth. 
According to the investigation on the slaughtering and meat processing plant run by 
Song in May, 1988, he could get the following economic benefits through the use of 
the collective license: 
1. Access to large-volume loans from banks. According to the bank regulations, 
individual7 loans should not exceed a maximum of 15,000 yuan, while one can borrow 
a loan of several hundred thousand on the strength of a collective license. 
2. The maximum interest rate on individual loans is 11.52%, while that on 
                                                 
7 By July 1988, no private enterprise had been registered in Sanhe County, and township and village 
enterprises were divided into collective ones and individual ones. 
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collective loans is 6.6%. Merely in this item alone, Song could save 9,840 yuan in 
interest on his 200,000 yuan loan. 
3. Private enterprises have to pay the local administration of industry and 
commerce 2% of their turnover as an overhead expense, while collective ones are 
exempt from such payment. In this item, Song could pay 20,000 yuan less if calculated 
on the basis of Song’s one-million-yuan production value. 
4. With private enterprises, the tax is calculated based on a graduated income tax 
rate of ten brackets, while with collective enterprises, the tax is based on a graduated 
income tax rate of eight brackets. Assuming that Song’s annual profit was 150,000 
yuan, he could save 15,950 yuan in taxes with the collective license. 
5. Newly started collective enterprises are granted a one-year exemption from 
product taxes, and a two-year exemption from income tax. According to his 
production scale then, Song avoided paying the county 230,000 yuan in such taxes 
during the first two years. 
Furthermore, self-employed laborers also had to pay the individual laborers’ 
association fee, and they had a lower wage after taxes. These factors, though tiny 
proportionally, represented a considerable figure to a plant with a one-million-yuan 
production value like Song’s.  
Overall, despite the fact that he paid the supplying and market agency and 
Nanguan village over 10,000 yuan from his profit, the benefits he received from the 
collective license were several hundred thousand yuan. From this case, we can see that 
the payoff gained by switching to the red hat for Mr. Song μf (which has taken the cost 
associated with the red hat, 10,000 yuan here, into consideration) is very large and the 
cost C of switching is almost none. Song has enjoyed tax avoidance, fee dodging, and 
excess income acquisition. As to the Nanguan village committee, their payoffs μg from 
the game are several thousand yuan a year without any contribution except for lending 
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their name. As the extensive game model we discussed previously predicted, Mr. Song 
and the Nanguan village committee choose the action (Propose, Accept).  
Case Two8:  
Tri-color Company of Tongling City, in Anhui province was private from its 
birth, when its founder Feng Gao put the first batch of products onto the market. Gao 
discovered that his clients lacked confidence in private enterprises, and that banks also 
took great precautions in dealing with private enterprises. On his first trip to Tongling 
to market his products, the first question asked by whoever he met was, “What’s the 
nature of your company?” Hence, in 1986, Feng Gao changed his company into a 
collective one, and moved the Tri-color Company from Yaogou Town in Wuwei 
County to Tongling City. Feng Gao himself became the company’s managing director, 
under assignment by the Bureau of Economy and Trade of the Shizishan District in 
Tongling City. The party equipped him with a branch secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Because the company now wore a red hat, it had to be managed as a 
red-hatted enterprise. However, the micromanagement from some government 
departments actually limited the further development of Tri-color, which had to apply 
for approval even for an investment of a mere 100,000 yuan. In 1996, Feng Gao 
planned to exclusively sponsor a Spring Festival soiree to be held in Shanghai, entitled 
“Eternal Friendship between Shanghai and Anhui People”. By doing so, he hoped to 
promote the reputation of his company as well as to express his appreciation for the 
support from people from all walks of life in Shanghai. This could have become a 
good activity in terms of public relations, for which Gao decided to donate 300,000 
yuan; however the project was aborted due to the disapproval of some administrative 
                                                 
8 This case is translated from Zhang and Wang, 1999, The Red Hat in Change, China Industry & 
Commerce, Vol. 1 
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departments. In 1993, Feng Gao attempted to invest in a chemical industry project, 
which was listed among the “National Torch Program Projects”, China’s most 
important high-tech industry program and a national guideline program. However, the 
application had to go through one administrative level after another, and it took two 
years’ time to obtain the final endorsement. The approval meeting by departments 
concerned alone had been held 11 times. All of these experiences exhausted Feng Gao. 
Further, in late 1995, the Tri-color ordered new equipment from Jiangsu Province for 
2,400,000 yuan, which was intended for developing high-pillar lamps. However, the 
machine was not put into use until 1997 due to more than year-long examination by 
the department in charge. The product turned out to be popular the moment it entered 
the market. “If we had been allowed to start the project earlier, we could have earned 
twice as much as 2,400,000 yuan by now,” said Feng Gao regretfully.  
Apart from regular routine reports, Feng Gao had to make numerous ad hoc 
reports to each department on demand, often repeatedly reporting the same content; 
any default could be interpreted as “no respect for authority”. When the authorities 
came to check his work, Feng Gao faced a dilemma. He would wind up in trouble if he 
did not receive them; but if he did, the visit would take up a half or even one whole 
day, because the officials would check not only the overall situation of the company 
but also the employee’s wages and welfare conditions. On February 28th, 1998, after 
having assumed a 14-year-long false name of “pseudo-collective enterprise”, the 
assets of Tri-color valued at 50,000,000 yuan were transferred to Feng Gao by the 
local government after several rounds of negotiation.  
In the initial period of market development, private enterprises were often 
subject to prejudice and doubts. This was particularly true in the second half of 1989, 
when there was mainly negative propaganda about them. Moreover, people used to 
associate private enterprises with “adulteration”, “fraud”, “speculation”, “tax dodging” 
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and “disorder”. That partly explains why private enterprises changed their company 
status: namely, for the sake of gaining trust from their consumers and customers. In 
case two, Gao wore a red hat to acquire a better social reputation and credibility to 
smooth the way for business negotiation. In this case, “Pseudo-collective” enterprises 
gained policy, ideological and economic benefits from the red hat, while the local 
government also got the overhead expenses paid and the decision-making authority 
relinquished by the firm. However, in the meantime, the unclear property rights made 
it impossible for Gao to act freely in the real market. With all these problems taken 
into consideration, Gao subsequently chose to take off the hat. For the local 
government, although the exact gains from allowing Gao to take off his hat were not 
specified, the context of several rounds of negotiation implied that the government 
extracted benefits. It became a win-win situation for taking off the hat.  
However, many lawsuits also have arisen in reaction to proposals to take off 
the red hat. The unclear property rights often cause disputes regarding the ownership 
of the enterprise property rights; a famous lawsuit of China car tycoon Yang Rong, ex-
chairman of Brilliance China Automotive (BCA)9 is a good example. In that case, the 
property rights are not easy to define and the gains of each party who obtain the 
property rights are huge. It therefore is rational for the local government not to allow 
Yang to take off the red hat.  
Conclusions and Discussions 
“Pseudo-collective” enterprises gained policy, ideological and economic 
benefits from putting on a “red hat”, while the local government also got a temporary 
break. All of these gains were compatible with the initial stage of market development 
of that time. The overhead expenses and the decision-making authority relinquished 
                                                 
9 The case of China car tycoon Yang Rong is covered in many international news reports.  
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by the red hat wearer were far less than what had been gained. However, as the 
reforms proceeded, all types of enterprises began to receive equal civil treatment. 
Furthermore, when the changing environment of “red hat” wearers offered losses as 
well as gains, it became hard for the red hat to stay on for long. 
With a change in the institutional environment, a rational entrepreneur will 
adopt new organizational forms that adapt to the new environment, or he will have to 
pay high switching costs in the near future. In the first and second stage of the 
development of the private economy, the “red-hat” enterprises could access cheap 
resources in the planned economy and obtain protections through transactions with 
local governments. In return, they had to relinquish a certain part of decision-making 
authority and industrial profits. When the transaction expenses (including the 
relinquished decision-making authority, joint demarcation of property rights, and a 
certain part of industrial profits) are far less than those faced in the market, private 
enterprises certainly prefer to stay with a “red hat”. In the third stage, with the 
strengthened market and equal treatment from governmental policy, the situation 
became different: the resources formerly controlled by the government could be 
purchased on the market, and thus the transaction expenses between enterprises and 
government became unnecessary. The relinquished decision-making authority of the 
private enterprise consequently fetters its further development and puts it at a 
disadvantage in the strengthened market. In addition the unclear property rights and all 
the hidden dangers the red hat entails cause private entrepreneurs to worry that if 
disputes emerge, it might put them into an unfavorable position. At this juncture, the 
institutional environment has changed, and resource allocation likewise is changing. 
The entrepreneurs, who can purchase key resources formerly controlled by 
government at the market place, pursue their interest in transactions with the market 
and tend to take off the hat.  
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The local government and central government also have an important role in 
the taking off of the red hat by private enterprises. The private economy has become a 
bright spot in terms of shaking off economic stagnation, enlarging employment 
opportunities, and improving economic growth since the 1997 National Conference of 
the Chinese Communist Party. Governments at all levels therefore have initiated 
various policies and measures to promote the development of the private economy, 
since the public economy alone no longer suffices as a measure of achievement for the 
administrators. Moreover, local governments also encourage pseudo-collectives to 
take off the “hat”, because they do not want to see the property rights disputes caused 
by the red hat fettering the development of private enterprises, as that could cause the 
loss of impetus for capital accumulation and require short-term governmental actions. 
On the one hand, the loss of enormous tax money and the irregular transactions 
associated with wearing red hats have become a hot-bed for corruption, and have 
interrupted the regular market order. Meanwhile, under the pressure of pseudo-
collectives, individual and private enterprises either are forced to suspend business or 
follow suit and put on red hats, which leads to the shrinking and malformation of 
individual and private enterprises. It is for this reason that the country has made very 
early efforts to investigate and purge this phenomenon of pseudo-collectives, but this 
has been in vain. Now, despite the fact that the tax policy has been unified and 
collective licenses no longer provide them with an opportunity to take advantage of 
the loopholes in policy, the government still regularly encourages the pseudo-
collectives to take off the “hat”. It does so because the registered number of private 
enterprises is far too low due to the existence of “pseudo-collectives”, which has 
affected the accuracy of state macroeconomic management and scientific analysis. 
According to this extensive game with perfect information, the rise and fall of 
the “red hat” are the rational results of the interaction between enterprises and local 
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governments. However, more information is needed to specify the utility function and 
how the payoffs would evolve in the transitional economy. This paper has examined 
the interaction between the private firms and the local government, with the 
assumption that the central government acted as a beneficial planner. Future research 
could bring in the central government as a third actor and use a game theory 
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CHAPTER 3 WHY DO PEOPLE INTERMARRY— A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
OF ASIAN AMERICAN’S MARITAL ASSIMILATION 
Introduction 
Interracial marriage in the United States has been the subject of debate over 
several decades, and it has been accepted as a key indicator of both social distance and 
assimilation (Alba and Golden 1986; Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Gordon, 1964; 
Lieberson and Waters 1990; Fu 2001; Park 1914). Because marriage represents an 
intimate and long-term relationship of co-equals, Kalmijn (1998) argues that growing 
intermarriage or heterogamy reflects shifting group boundaries and bears on the 
potential for assimilation and cultural and socioeconomic change. Besharow and 
Sullivan (1996) argue that the rapid increase of interracial marriage in the 1980s 
reflected the improvement of race relations and the decline of racial distance. The 
extent of interracial marriage is often viewed from the perspective of national 
prevalence which implicitly assumes a single national marriage market (for example, 
Kalmijn 1993; Qian 1997).  
However, marital patterns differ quite substantially on the basis of geographic 
location and racial composition. Harris and Ono (2005) argue that most national 
estimates of homogamy-heterogamy odds ratios do not account for variation in racial 
composition across marriage markets and thus geographic constraints on interracial 
marriage may be misinterpreted as evidence of social distance between groups. Using 
data from the 1990 census, they indeed find that national estimates of race effects on 
partnering decline dramatically and variously (from 19 percent to 53 percent) once 
they control for the racial composition of local marriage markets, and that potential 
biases are largest for white-Hispanic or white-Asian marriages. Their study show that 
the assessments of social distance from intermarriage with a single national marriage 
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market assumption are sometimes confounded with the geographic constraints of local 
marriage markets on intermarriage (Blackwell, Qian, & Lichter 2006).  
Previous research has shown that racial composition varies across local areas 
(Massey, 2001; Sandefur et al., 2001) and race effects on partnering also vary by 
region (Model and Fisher, 2001; Rosenfeld, 2001). Data from the 2000, created by the 
Lewis Mumford Center1, indicates that racial composition varies across metropolitan 
areas. Asian Americans accounts for 3.6 percent of total population, however, its 
geographic distribution differ substantially across metropolitan areas. For example, 
Asians are 69 percent of the population in Honolulu, 27 percent in San Jose, and 25 
percent in San Francisco, but only 10 percent of the population in New York, 4 
percent in Philadelphia, and 1 percent in Pittsburgh. In addition, the Asian American 
population has expanded in size and distribution throughout the United States since 
the 1970s. According to Barnes and Bennett (2002), Asian Americans were 
predominantly concentrated in Hawaii and California in 1970 (about 1.5 million), and 
its population was increased to 13 million by 2000 and dispersed through the US with 
significant communities in Seattle, WA; New York, NY; Houston, TX; Newark, NJ; 
Chicago, IL; and Minneapolis, MN.  
In recent studies, researchers have begun to interpret intermarriage from the 
scope of local marriage markets. For example, using census data from 1980 and 1990 
in selected metropolitan areas, Rosenfeld (2001) examines race and ethnic effects on 
interracial marriage in several large multiethnic marriage markets, and finds that both 
Hispanic and Asian pan-national identities are a significant force in mate selection and 
the strength of such pan-national Hispanic and Asian associations vary by region, 
education, and nativity. This suggests taking a single national marriage market 
                                                 
1 Racial composition, Dissimilarity index, and Exposure index by metropolitan areas can be 
downloaded from http://mumford.albany.edu/census/data.html. 
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approach may overlook the varying degrees of underlying tendency to intermarry and 
the varying racial composition across the US. 
Previous studies have shown that interracial marriage is distributed unevenly in 
the US (Rosenfeld, 2001). According to a social and demographic trends report 
released by Pew Rsearch Center (2010), in 2008, a record of 14.6% of all new 
marriages in the US were between spouses belonging to different race or ethnicity 
groups, and that intermarriage rates varied by region, by state and racial group. Study 
the interracial marriage at the national level might not give a complete picture of 
interracial marriage. To examine how local marriage market conditions affect 
interracial marriage, the multilevel model (or in another term, hierarchical linear 
model) is ideal (Mason, Wong, & Entwisle, 1983). Individuals are nested within local 
areas and tend to form their marriages within local marriage markets (e.g., Lewis and 
Oppenheimer, 2000; South and Crowder, 1999). The multilevel design controls for 
local marriage market conditions and presumably yields less-biased standard errors 
and p values for the contextual effects (Kalmijn and Tubergen, 2010). In addition, as 
shown in Figure 3.1, the rate of interracial marriage varies by state, which also 







Figure 3.1 Interracial Marriage Rate by State 
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Asian Americans have succeeded in many areas (e.g., educational and 
occupational attainment) and intermarriage rates are high; they have come to 
symbolize successful assimilation into the mainstream of America. Yet, because the 
race effects on partnering may differ between national market and local marriage 
markets for white-Asian marriages (and white-Hispanic marriages, as shown by Harris 
and Ono, 2005), I examine data extracted from the recent American Community 
Survey 2008 1% sample from the Integrated Public Use Microdata (IPUMS). I also 
apply multilevel logistic regression models to explore how local marriage markets 
conditions affect the Asian American’s assimilation through assortative mating.  
The paper is organized as following: I first review the literature on interracial 
marriage, and then provide a theoretical perspective trying to integrate the existing 
theories. This is followed by a discussion of data and methods. Using the 2008 
American Community Survey data, I employ multilevel logistic regression models to 
understand how local structural factors help weaken racial boundaries between Asian 
and non-Asian groups. Then I presents the results and interpretation of findings, 
followed by my last section, where I conclude that local marriage market and multi-
level analysis that incorporates micro- and macro-level variables helps us to better 
understand how racial minorities (such as Asian Americans and immigrants) are 
incorporated into the United States through assortative mating. I also argue the need to 
pay special attention to the geographic distribution of population and the nativity or 





Traditionally three mostly complementary perspectives have been used to 
explain the prevalence of racial and ethnic intermarriage: assimilationist, structuralist, 
and status exchange. I will review the three perspectives respectively. 
Assimilation Theory 
In the field of assimilation theory, the most influential and dominant 
perspective is Milton Gordon’s (1964) seven-stage model. He brings forward the 
dimensions to assimilation theory, and argues that assimilation has multiple forms and 
that different kinds of assimilation can occur at very different rates. He argues that 
assimilation begins with acculturation (cultural or behavioral assimilation), and then 
proceeds through structural assimilation, which is “large scale entrance into cliques, 
clubs, and institutions of the host society in a primary group.” Structural assimilation 
inevitably leads to marital assimilation and is the “keystone of the arch of 
assimilation.” When large-scale intermarriage takes place, the minority group melds 
into the host society, “identificational assimilation” takes place, and the other stages, 
that is, “absence of prejudice, discrimination, and value and power conflict” will 
follow naturally. He claims that compared with those who do not intermarry, those 
who intermarry generally possess of greater social, political, and economic 
characteristics that are more like those of the host society. This assimilationist view of 
inter-group relationships has been shared by many students of racial and ethnic 
relations (Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Massey 
1981;Massey and Mullan, 1984; Qian and Lichter, 2001, 2007; Rosenfeld 2002; 
Woodrum, 1981).  
However, Gordon’s view of assimilation as a one-way uniform process by 
which all immigrants would eventually conform to the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
middle-class core culture has been criticized for its ethnocentricity and inevitability. In 
 80 
Remaking the American Mainstream, Alba and Nee (2003) extend the classical 
assimilation theory to account for the recent diverse immigrant groups and regard 
assimilation as an incremental process that stems from individuals’ purposive action 
and the unintended consequences of their workaday decisions to optimize on past 
investments in human, cultural and social capital (Nee and Sanders 2001). Their new 
assimilation theory does not assume a one-direction process, inevitable, or irreversible, 
but an incremental process that must be explained as a contingent outcome stemming 
from the cumulative effect of individual choices and collective action in close-knit 
groups, which are expressed differently both within and across ethnic groups. 
Assimilation is caused by a repertoire of behavioral mechanisms, the precise mix of 
proximate ones varying considerably across groups (Nee and Alba 2003). According 
to Alba and Nee (2003), social boundaries such as race and ethnicity are socially 
constructed, and can be “crossed,” “blurred,” or “shifted” across generations, and thus, 
the American mainstream can be “remade” by the contemporary influx of immigrants 
from diverse backgrounds (see Qian and Lichter 2007 for more discussion about Alba 
and Nee’s assimilation theory).  
According to Gordon (1964), the greater primary structural assimilation occurs 
the longer the members of an immigrant group have been in the United States. 
Nativity plays an important role in predicting intermarriage. The out-group marriage 
tends to increase along with length of residence in the host country and over 
successive generations (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982). Using US 1990 Census data, 
Qian and Lichter (2001) show that marital assimilation differ between natives and 
immigrants across racial minorities and nativity remains a significant barrier to 




Another major contribution comes from Blau’s structural opportunity 
perspective (Blau, 1977; Blau et al., 1982, 1984, 1988). This theory concerns how the 
structural composition of the population confines marriage choice, i.e., how the 
availability of potential marriage partners constrains or facilitates opportunities for 
contact and ultimately marital choice. Structural variables center on the size and 
composition of the population with specific characteristics, such as race or imbalanced 
sex ratio, shaping marital opportunities. He argues that the intermarriage is not only 
shaped by group-specific attributes such as the group’s size and sex ratio, but also 
affected by social and spatial proximity between groups, such as socioeconomic 
inequality. Blau and his followers have concentrated on explaining variations in 
intermarriage rates at the community level using aggregate census data. The structural 
approach focuses on the opportunity for intergroup relations as determined by the 
relative size of the minority group, the availability of potential partners in the minority 
group, internal diversity and the social and spatial proximity between groups (Blau et 
al., 1984; Fitzpatrick & Hwang, Fossett & Kiecolt, 1991; 1992; Lichter, McLaughlin, 
Kephart, & Landry, 1992; South & Messner, 1986).  
Exchange Theory 
The exchange hypothesis is concerned with whether people exchange or trade 
valued resources or characteristics in the marriage market. This tradition can be traced 
back to Merton (1941). Merton argues that male African Americans are more likely to 
marry white women than are their female counterparts; some highly-educated and 
African American men presumably exchange higher achieved socioeconomic status 
for the white women’s higher ascribed social status. He termed this pattern as 
“hypogamy for white women.” After more than 60 years, Merton’s exchange thesis 
still remains the focus of debate among scholars of intermarriage (Kalmijn, 1998) and 
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continues to stimulate research. Many findings from early studies reaffirmed Merton’s 
theory (Heer 1974; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989; Kalmijn 1993). For example, 
Kalmijn (1993) shows that the pattern of white women marrying black men with 
higher levels of education remained stable in both 1970s and early 1980s. Some find 
status-race exchange also exists among Hispanics (Aderson and Saenz, 1994; Cready 
and Saenz, 1997; Gilbertson et al., 1996; Schoen et al., 1989).  
Some scholars nevertheless have doubts about the statistical evidence of 
hypogamy and question the usefulness of exchange theory in explaining even for the 
black experience (Heaton and Albrecht, 1996). Hwang et al. (1995) shows that this 
exchange pattern does not hold for Asian Americans. They apply multinomial logit 
models to a representative U.S. sample of married Asians and find that Asian women 
with lower educational attainment have higher probability to out marry, while Asian 
men provide weak evidence of negative selectivity of SES and tend to marry persons 
with lower educational attainment than themselves. After examining the intermarriage 
among 16 ethnic groups, Jacobs and Labov (2002) claim that this exchange pattern 
does not hold for the majority of Asian white marriages nor for the four Hispanic 
groups, and conclude that the applicability of such theory, which comes from the test 
on black and white marriage, should perhaps be limited to intermarriage between 
blacks and whites. Analyzing data from the 1990 US Census, Liang and Ito (1999) 
examine the intermarriage patterns of five Asian American groups (Chinese, Koreans, 
Indians, Japanese, and Filipinos) in the New York City region according to gender, 
nativity, and education and find little evidence for Merton's (1941) hypothesis. They 
find that US-born Asians are much more likely to intermarry than foreign-born Asians, 
and that Asian women are much more likely to intermarry than Asian men.  
Intermarried individuals often shared similar educational levels. Qian (1999) et al., 
apply log-linear models to examine assortative mating patterns by race/ethnicity, 
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educational attainment, and nativity status. However, they find little or no evidence 
that Asian Americans marry less-educated whites in exchange for "higher" racial 
status.  
In fact, Merton suggests that the theory of structural components in 
intermarriage complements the theory of personal interaction.  
 
Opportunity and Preferences within Local Marriage Markets: An Integration of 
Macro and Micro perspective 
 
Lieberson and Waters (1988) have offered a useful conceptual model of the 
determinants of interethnic marriage. Opportunity affects the odds of intermarriage, as 
does the disposition of others toward one’s group and disposition of members of one’s 
own group toward other group, which in turn are shaped by socioeconomic 
background. Alan Gray (1987) also proposes an opportunity-preference model to 
decompose the probability of intermarriage2 into components of opportunity (marriage 
market representation), and preference (the combination of social barriers and social 
distance between groups). Examining the opportunity and preference within the local 
marriage markets has the potential to integrate the three traditions in intermarriage 
research. Structural constraints, such as the group’s size and sex ratio in local marriage 
markets, spatial proximity, shape potential marital partners’ opportunities for 
interaction and intimacy. Exchange theory can also be included in this preference. 
Here, the preferences can be multidimensional and exchangeable. For example, white 
women marrying black men can exchange their racial status for the social economic 
                                                 
2 The probability of a marriage occurs can be decomposed into the probability the two partners will 
meet in the marriage market, and given the probability they meet, the probability that they will be 
chosen by each other as marriage partners. 
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status. According to assimilation theory, after controlling for the opportunities, there 
would be no strong racial preference between the white race and the assimilated.  
The macro-structural and the assimilation perspectives have been regarded as 
two complementary approaches to intermarriage, while using multi-level models to 
control for the local marriage market characteristics and to consider the possible 
interactions has become a valuable statistical tool (Mason, Wong, & Entwisle, 1983). 
It therefore is surprising that we have not seen more progress in integrating macro 
level and micro level factors in analyses of intermarriage patterns. There are a few 
exceptions that attempt to integrate micro- and macro-level explanations to understand 
intermarriage by incorporating assimilationist and structural perspectives (Hwang et 
al., 1994; Hwang, Saenz, and Aguirre 1997; Kalmijn and Tubergen, 2010; Lievens 
1998). However, Hwang et al. (1997) have acknowledged the complexity of the 
multilevel models and focused only on the additive effects of two sets of individual 
factors and community level factors without full implementation of hierarchical 
models.  
Previous research has shown that overall rates of interracial marriage have 
increased over time. For example, Qian (1997) uses log-linear models to examine the 
interracial marriage pattern and trends by looking at the 1980 and 1990 census, and 
finds that interracial marriage increased between 1980 and 1990 after controlling for 
racial composition. However, we do not know whether national intermarriage patterns 
and trends reflect changing preferences or demographic composition of local marriage 
markets. This paper attempts to explain intermarriage between Asians and non-Asians 
to understand how people’s in-group preferences are constrained by structural 
circumstances of local marriage markets through multi-level modeling. The multi-
level models or Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) “enable us to conceptualize in 
terms of (nested) multiple levels” (Raudenbush and Bryk, 1986:3). They give more 
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reliable parameter estimates and efficient standard errors by taking autocorrelation 
into account. The metropolitan areas act as the local marriage market, and “the context 
effects would be underestimated in a normal regression model and the effect would 
often be falsely accepted as significant” (Kalmijin and Tubergen, 2010). This paper 
attempts to take advantage of the multilevel design which yields less-biased standard 
errors and p values for the context effect. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
 
The data for this study is based on the 1% sample from the Integrated Public 
Use Microdata (IPUMS) of the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS 
provides an annual snapshot of the American population similar to that provided by 
the decennial census long form. The 2008 ACS datasets are full 1% samples 
containing more than 2,800,000 person records. The IPUMS version of the 2005-2008 
ACS constructed at the University of Minnesota provides additional geographic 
identifiers and constructed variable identifying married couples in the household 
which are not available via the Census Bureau. 3 One feature of IPUMS version of 
ACS data collects individuals’ spouse information if they are married. These variables 
were constructed based on individuals’ relationship to the household head, adjacency 
on the census form, and similarity in age (IPUMs 2008).  
Despite being a highly useful large-scale database for the study of race and 
ethnicity in U.S., these data are not without limitations. ACS data are cross-sectional 
and do not contain information on where marriages occurred. It is therefore, possible 
                                                 
3 http://usa.ipums.org/usa/acs.shtml 
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that some marriages were formed aboard and ideally these couples should be 
eliminated from the analysis since our analysis focus on factors influencing interracial 
marriage in the USA context only. In addition, the ACS data, like the census data, 
measures the prevalence of marriage rather than the incidence.  With data on intact 
marriages, I am unable to include marriages that ended in divorce, which previous 
study indicate may be disproportionately interracial. The metropolitan-level 
information in the ACS refers to current rather than the residence when couples got 
married. Some people move between the time of their marriages and the ACS survey. 
According to a research on internal migration of married couples by Blackburn (2010), 
only about 8% of the 3-year periods identified in their data involved a move (defined 
as any changes in address). It would be reasonable to assume that for the majority of 
couples the residence place when they got married and the residence place at the 
survey year are the same if we count them at the metropolitan level. However, to 
minimize the noise, I limit my analysis to recent marriages, in which couples married 
within 5 years of the ACS 2008.  
Age at first marriage is not available in recent decennial census data (1980 
census and 2008 ACS are exceptions) and the census does not ask about prior 
marriages for currently married couples. Because intra- and inter-racial marriage 
patterns differ between first marriage and remarriage (Jacobs and Furstenburg 1986; 
Kitano et al. 1984), it is ideal to study recent first marriage. Also older people are 
expected to have higher rates of intermarriage because the passage of time is 
associated with increasing tolerance for exogamy (Patterson 1997). To minimize the 
selection bias caused by remarriage, intermarriage researchers, in practice, limit 
marriages to those younger couples since they are more likely to have married 
relatively recently, and are less likely to have experienced a divorce and remarriage 
(Fu 2001; Qian 1997; Harris and Ono 2005). Here, I take the advantage of the newly 
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released 2008 ACS, which includes age at first marriage and information on the 
number of times one has been married. My analysis is limited to Asian men and 
women who are native-born Americans or who immigrated to the United States before 
their first marriage and who married within the past 5 years. However, this restriction 
has not eliminated the possibilities that some recently arrived married Asian could 
have brought their spouses to the United States sometime after they arrived.  
The cross-section aspect of the ACS data also limits causal inferences. 
Considering that the individual’s socioeconomic status is included as an explanatory 
variable for a person’s selection of marriage partner, theoretically it should be 
measured prior to or at the time of marriage rather than using the current 
socioeconomic status at the time of survey because a person’s socioeconomic status 
may change after marriage. I address this potential problem by using educational 
attainment as an indicator of a person’s socioeconomic status; education is a stable 
characteristic in adulthood and is highly correlated with occupational status and 
income. Education is a reliable predictor of long-term economic well-being (Kalmijn 
1993a); it serves as a salient proxy for past and future socioeconomic status of the 
married individuals studied.  
Table 3.1 presents the racial distribution of the spouses of Asians. It shows that 
only a sizeable proportion of Asian Americans are married out. The rate of out-
marriage among Asian women was almost twice of that of Asian men. About 33% 
Asian women who married within 5 years of 2008 ACS married someone of different 




Table 3.1 Race of Spouse, First Marriage of Asians (Newly Married, 15-55 Years Old)  
 Asian men           Asian women 
Asian 2,939 (82.8%) 2,815 (66.9%) 
White 478 (13.5%) 1,176 (28.0%) 
Black 20 (0.6%) 71 (1.7%) 
Hispanic 103  (2.9%) 136 (3.2%) 
Other 10 (0.3%) 10 (0.2%) 
Total 3,550 (100.1%) 4,208 (100.0%) 
Note: “Newly married” refers to people who got married within 5 years of the 2008 ACS (similarly 
hereinafter). 
Although rates of outmarriage differ between Asian men and women, 
outmarriage with whites is the norm. Figure 3.2 shows that among those who married 
interracially, the large majority of Asian men and women married out to a white 
person, with Asian women (85%) slightly more likely than Asian men (78%) to marry 
a white person. Asian women are also slightly more likely than Asian men to marry a 
black person (5% versus 3%). In contrast, for marriages between Asians and 
Hispanics, Asian men have higher percentage than Asian women to marry a Hispanic 
person (17% versus 10%).  
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I further disaggregate Asians by ethnic groups and nativity. Table 3.2 shows 
marriage types of Asian men and women by their nativity status. For both Asian men 
and women, the rate of Asian ethnic endogamy declines along generation line with 
first generation having the largest proportion of same ethnic marriage (88% for Asian 
men and 67% for Asian women), and with 2nd or higher generation (native-born) 
having smallest (45% for Asian men and 40% for Asian women). The rate of 
interracial marriage (marriage between Asian and non-Asian) increases across 
generations. First generation has the lowest level of interracial marriage while second 
or higher generation has the highest level. Pan-Asian marriage has similar pattern as 
interracial marriage4. 
                                                 
4 A detailed discussion of pan-ethnicity and nativity would be covered in another paper on assimilation. 
Figure 3.2 Percent of Spouse's Race among Out-Marriage of Asian Men and Women, 
First Marriage, Newly Married, Asian aged 15-55 
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1,690 98 142 1,930  1,628 134 663 2,425 
(87.6) (5.1) (7.4) (100)  (67.1) (5.5) (27.3) (100) 
1.5th 
Gen. 
513 101 170 784  478 89 343 910 
(65.4) (12.9) (21.7) (100)  (52.5) (9.8) (37.7) (100) 
Native-
born 
379 158 299 836  348 138 387 873 
(45.3) (18.9) (35.8) (100)  (39.9) (15.8) (44.3) (100) 
Total 2,582 357 611 3,550  2,454 361 1,393 4,208 (72.7) (10.1) (17.2) (100)  (58.3) (8.6) (33.1) (100) 
Note: Proportions are in parentheses. Ethnic endogamy refers to marriage among a specific Asian ethnic 
group (such as Chinese endogamy, Japanese endogamy etc.). 
 
Table 3.3 shows the proportion of immigrants in each ethnic group. Most 
Asian groups are predominantly immigrants. For example, 89% of Asian Indian men 
and 82% of Korean men are foreign-born Americans. Japanese group has a relatively 
smaller proportion of immigrants with men having 46% of immigrants and women 




Table 3.3 Ethnicity and Nativity of Asian Samples (First Marriage, Newly Married, 
and 15-55 Years Old) 















Chinese 668 18.8 77.1 865 20.6 80.9 
Japanese 123 3.5 46.3 236 5.6 71.2 
Filipino 529 14.9 66.9 777 18.5 80.3 
Asian Indian 915 25.8 89.3 781 18.6 88.1 
Korean 278 7.8 82.4 394 9.4 84.0 
Vietnamese 353 9.9 87.5 376 8.9 85.9 
Other Asian ethnics 
or combination 
684 19.3 63.3 779 18.5 64.3 
Total 3,550 100.0 76.5 4,208 100.0 79.3 
 
Dependent Variable 
The odds of interracial marriage of Asian Americans with non-Asians5will be 
measured using logistic regression models within the multilevel context. The 
dependent variable “intermarriage” is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 when the 
marriage is between an Asian minority and a non-Asian spouse, and 0 otherwise. The 
model is estimated separately for Asian men and Asian women.  
                                                 
5 I also analyze the intermarriage between Asians and non-Hispanic whites, and found similar results. 
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Independent Variables 
Individual Level Variables 
Nativity Status 
The sample is limited here to native-born Asian Americans or Asian 
immigrants who came to the United States before their first marriage. This would 
exclude most immigrants who married abroad and moved to the United State. The out-
group marriage tends to increase along with length of residence in the host country 
and over successive generations (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982). Qian and Lichter 
(2001) show that there are more interethnic or interracial marriages among native-born 
than among foreign-born Asian Americans, and that there are more interethnic 
marriages among later-generation than among early-generations. With this 
consideration, I create three dummies indicating their nativity statuses as native-born 
(2nd and higher generation), those who immigrated to the U.S. before age 14 (fully or 
partially socialized under the U.S. context, 1.5th generation), and those who 
immigrated after age 14 but before their first marriage (socialized under their sending 
country, 1st generation). I would expect Asians born or raised in the U.S. are more 
likely than foreign-born Asians to be involved in interracial marriages. 
English Proficiency 
English proficiency is measured by the variable “SPEAKENG” in ACS which 
indicates whether the respondent speaks only English at home, and also reports how 
well the respondent, who speaks a language other than English at home, speaks 
English. We also create 3 dummies, which describe their English speaking ability as 
“do not speak English/not well”, “speak well/very well”, and “speak only English”.  
Educational Attainment 
Socioeconomic assimilation is measured through status attainment, i.e., 
education, occupational status, and income. As we discussed before, other 
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determinants of socioeconomic background such as income and occupation are not 
included because the ACS data measures income and occupation at the time of survey 
but not at the time of marriage. Although education is also measured at the time of 
survey, it changes less over time after marriage compared to income or occupation. In 
addition, education is often regarded as the major indicator of socioeconomic status 
which is highly correlated with income and occupation and the inclusion of all three in 
one model could introduce multicollinearity (Gordon 1968, cited in Hwang et al. 
1997). 
Education attainment affects marital choice in terms of both opportunity and 
preference. Educational institutions provide settings for intergroup interaction. 
Education attainment is believed to have an effect on values, attitudes, knowledge, and 
life-styles of an individual (Kalmijn 1998). Highly educated persons may embrace 
more individualistic attitudes that may counteract the influence of family origin in 
mate selection (Kalmijn 1991). Higher education also may weaken identification with 
the origin group (Hwang et al. 1995). Studies of intermarriage find that in white ethnic 
group (Lieberson and Waters 1988) and blacks (Kalmijn 1993a), interethnic 
partnership is more common among highly-educated members than among their less-
educated peers so we expect that different level of education qualification would yield 
a difference in the probability of intermarriage likewise.  
Educational attainment is measured by the number of years completed by an 
individual.  
Macro-structural Variables at Metropolitan-level 
The macro-structural variables or marriage market conditions include 
metropolitan-level indicators such as relative size of Asian group, racial heterogeneity 
index, sex ratio within Asian group. Following Lewis and Oppenheimer (2000), I 
define local marriage markets as Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas and 
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Metropolitan Statistical Areas for urban populations6. All these macro-structural 
variables are measured at each metropolitan area.  
Group Size 
Group size measures opportunities for inter-group interaction. Blau (1984) 
argues that the relative group size has a negative effect on intergroup relations. In 
small groups, opportunities for ingroup contacts are substantially lower, leading to a 
higher probability of intergroup contacts. I expect to find a negative effect of relative 
group size on the marriage between a Asian and a non-Asian, i.e., the probability of 
being married to Non-Asian groups would be lower in local marriage markets where 
the relative size of Asian Americans is large and higher where the relative size of 
Asian minority group is small, other things being equal. Group size is measured as the 
percent of Asians in the total population (15 to 55 years old) at the metropolitan-level 
in 2008. This variable is attached to individual records and does not vary within the 
metropolitan area. 
Sex Ratio 
I measure the sex ratio for Asian minorities by taking the natural log 
transformation of the number of non-institutionalized Asian men per non-
institutionalized Asian women (both groups are aged between 15 and 55) at each 
metropolitan area. After transformation, the sex ratio is balanced if it is 0 and the 
range is (-∞, ∞). When the sex ratio is below 0, Asian men are scarce compared to 
Asian women; and when it is above 0, there are more Asian men than women within a 
metropolitan area, and therefore Asian men would probably look outside of racial 
                                                 
6 According to IPUMS 2008, the Census Bureau has not released information associating the PUMA 
boundaries (the lowest level of geography) with 2005-onward metropolitan area definitions, and thus 
the METAREAs in the 2008 ACS IPUMs data present metropolitan classifications based on 
metropolitan boundaries from 2000. The definition of METAREA variable in 2008 ACS is consistent 
with that of Census 2000. 
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boundary for marriage partners. Due to the computation of the Asian sex ratio, it has 
different effects on Asian men and women. For men, the Asian sex ratio would be 
positively related to interracial marriage; for women, the Asian sex ratio would be 
negatively related to intermarriage.  
Racial Heterogeneity Index 
The macro-structural theory predicts that contact opportunities are high in 
places with many different groups and where the population is evenly distributed over 
these groups (Blau 1977, Blau etc. 1984). The heterogeneity index (also called index 
of diversity) is the probability that any two persons randomly selected from a 
metropolitan area are of a difference race (Lieberson 1969). I construct the racial 
heterogeneity index at each metropolitan area as H ൌ 1 െ ∑ p୧ଶ୧ , where p୧ is the 
proportion of each racial group at metropolitan level (Lieberson 1969). According to 
Lieberson (1969), the maximum level of H is 1 െ ଵN given a finite number of groups. 
Here we have 5 groups (non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and 
non-Hispanic Asians, and non-Hispanic other racial group, the theoretical range of 
racial heterogeneity index is between 0 and 0.8. When heterogeneity index has a score 
of 0, it means that two randomly selected persons in the metropolitan area come from 
the same race group (no racial diversity); when the score is 0.8, it means the two 
randomly selected persons have different races and the racial diversity is high.  
As predicted by macro-structural theory, higher rates of Asian-nonAsian 
intermarriage are expected in local marriage market where racial heterogeneity index 
is high.  
I also include the age at first marriage and, to address skewness in the size 
distribution of metropolitan areas, the log transformation of the total metropolitan 
population (aged 15-55) as a control variable in our models.  
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Methods 
I use multi-level logistic regression model for hypotheses testing. All 
individuals are nested in metropolitan areas. In total, 284 metropolitan areas are 
identified in ACS 2008 IPUMs. To obtain reliable estimates of the metropolitan-level 
effects, I exclude metropolitan areas with very few individuals (only those 
metropolitan areas with at least 5 individuals are included). As predicted by the macro 
structural theory, relative group size would have negative effects on intermarriage. 
Deleting areas with very few Asian minorities (e.g., less than 5 individuals from the 
Asian group) would likely underestimate the effects of relative group size on 
intermarriage. Data in Table 3.4 shows that the intermarriage rates for Asian men and 
Asian women lower after restricting the sample to areas with size Asian minority 
populations (16% and 31% versus 17% and 33%). The rate of out-marriage among 
Asian women was still about twice of that of Asian men. 
After imposing restrictions on the sample, the non-weighted sample consists of 
3099 Asian men and 3694 Asian women, which yields 68 metropolitan areas for Asian 
men with an average number of 46 married Asian men (15-55 years old) and 84 
metropolitans for Asian women with an average number of 44 married Asian women 
(15-55 years old). 
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables. Please note that the range for Asian sex ratios is different for Asian men and 
women since we have restricted our analysis to metropolitan areas with at least 5 
married individuals in Asian groups. Both Asian men and Asian women in our sample 
have an average of 15 years of education. Age at first marriage was 30 for Asian men 
and 29 for Asian women. For nativity status, a little more than half are first 
generations (55% for Asian men and 57% for Asian women); about one fifth are 
native-born, second or higher generations. Around one fourth of individuals in our 
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sample speak only English at home, which seems to be consistent with the proportion 
of native-born in the total Asian sample.  
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 Asian Men (N=3099) Asian Women(N=3694) 
 Mean Sd. Min Max Mean Sd. Min Max 
Dependent variable        
Intermarriage 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 
        
Independent variables        
Individual level         
Years of education 15.47 3.09 0 21 15.35 2.90 0 21 
Age at 1st marriage 30.29 5.64 15 55 28.5 5.99 15 53 
1st gen. 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.57 0.49 0 1 
1.5th gen. 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Native-born 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Not speak/not well 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 
well/very well 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Speak only English 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
         




10.07 0.95 6.98 11.35 9.99 0.99 7.02 11.35 
         
Metropolitan level         
Group size 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.67 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.67 
Sex ratio(logged)  -0.12 0.06 -0.45 0.10 -0.12 0.07 -0.52 0.10 
Racial 
Heterogeneity Index 0.57 0.11 0.18 0.67 0.57 0.12 0.18 0.67 
 
For macro-level variables, relative group size of Asian (percent of Asian) 
varies from 1 percent to 67 percent in our sample across the metropolitan areas. Asian 
sex ratio (logged) has a range of (-.52, .1), and if we take the exponential of the 
minimum and maximum of sex ratio (logged), we have a range of .6 to 1.1. If we 
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transform it to the percent of Asian men in the Asian population, percent of Asian men 
varies from 48% to 60% across the metropolitan areas. Racial heterogeneity index also 
varies between macro-level areas with a range from 0.18 to 0.67.  
The analysis proceeds with the following steps. I will first perform a single-
level logistic analysis, using individual-level predictors and control variables. This 
single-level analysis will be used as the starting point. I then account for variation in 
intermarriage across marriage market areas. Then I add contextual-level variables, 
examine possible changes in individual level effects, and interpret the effects of the 
metropolitan level variables.  
Stata 11 was used to obtain the parameter estimates. 
The multilevel logistic regression model is well described with examples in 
Guo and Zhao (2000). In our analysis, model 1 is a single-level model which can be 
written as  
logሾ݌௜ ሺ1 െ ݌௜ሻ⁄ ሿ ൌ β଴ ൅ ∑ β୩X୩୧୩            ⑴ 
where ݌௜ is the probability of person ݅ being married to a non-Asian partner (versus a 
Asian partner), β଴ the intercept, βk the regression coefficient associated with the 
predictor Xk୧. 
In model 2 we allow for variation between metropolitan areas in the 
probability of being married to a non-Asian partner versus an Asian partner. The 
model becomes  
logൣ݌௜௝ ൫1 െ ݌௜௝൯⁄ ൧ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ∑ β୩୨X୩୧୩          (level 1 model)      ⑵ 
and  
ߚ଴௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߤ଴௝                    (level 2 model)        ⑶ 
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where ݌௜௝ is the probability of person ݅ being married to a non-Asian partner (versus a 
Asian partner) in metropolitan ݆, β଴୨ the intercept in metropolitan j, βk୨ the regression 
coefficient associated with the predictor Xk୧, β଴ the overall intercept, and ߤ଴௝ is the 
random effect accounting for the random variation at level two with ߤ଴௝~ ܰሺ0, ߪఓଶሻ 
Equation (2) and (3) can be combined as 
logൣ݌௜௝ ൫1 െ ݌௜௝൯⁄ ൧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ β୩୨X୧୨୩ ൅ µ଴୨    (combined model)    ⑷ 
In model 3 we have included metropolitan level predictors, and the level 2 
model is given by  
ߚ଴௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ ௤ܹ௝ ൅௤ ߤ଴௝             (level 2 model)           ⑸ 
where Wqj a vector of metropolitan-level characteristics.  
The combined model can be written as 
logൣ݌௜௝ ൫1 െ ݌௜௝൯⁄ ൧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ W୯୨ ൅୯ ∑ β୩୨X୧୨୩ ൅ µ଴୨  (combined model) ⑹ 
 
Results 
Table 3.5 presents the results of logistic regression model and multilevel 
logistic (random intercept) models of intermarriage on individual and contextual 
variables for Asian men who are native born or had immigrated to the United States 
before his first marriage. Individual level parameters show little change when 
metropolitan-level variation is included in the analysis. For example, the changes in 
the coefficients of English proficiency and nativity status dummies are small, 
indicating the individual-level effects of English proficiency and nativity status are 
robust when macro-level variation is controlled. Asian men’ age at first marriage in 
the single-level model shows a small negative effect (-.03) on intermarriage, and loses 
its significance when macro-level variations were introduced.  
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Table 3.5 Single-level and Multilevel Logistic Regression of Intermarriage of Asian 
Men in Metropolitan Areas, ACS 2008 (N= 3,099) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b se b se b se 
Individual effects          
Years of education -0.01 0.021 -0.02 0.021 -0.03 0.021 
Age at 1st marriage -0.03** 0.010 -0.02* 0.010 -0.02 0.010 
1.5th gen. 0.72*** 0.148 0.75*** 0.152 0.74*** 0.150 
Native-born 0.93*** 0.151 1.02*** 0.155 1.06*** 0.152 
well/very well 1.19* 0.523 1.23* 0.527 1.28* 0.527 
Speak only English 2.81*** 0.529 2.97*** 0.534 3.02*** 0.533 
       




-0.06 0.057 -0.17 0.114 -0.06 0.083 
       
Metropolitan level       
Group size     -2.62*** 0.501 
Sex ratio (logged)     -1.86* 0.876 
Racial 
Heterogeneity Index 
    -0.96 0.649 
       
Constant -2.39** 0.846 -1.30 1.246 -1.86* 0.935 
       
Pseudo R2 .18      
Number of 
Metropolitan areas 
  68  68 
Residual Group-
Level Variance   .250  .007 
 Standard errors in second column 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Contrary to the predictions by previous research, there is no positive 
educational effect of Asian minorities on interracial marriage (the effect is negative 
and not significant). However, over one half of all Asians are first generation, and 
educational attainment is positively correlated with English proficiency. Previous 
researches often examine native-born Americans who would not worry about their 
English proficiency. For example, Qian’s (1997) well-known analysis of racial 
assortative mating has shown that the odds of interracial marriage increases with 
couples’ educational attainment. Consequently, I re-estimated the single-level and 
multilevel logistic regression models without English proficiency and found a positive 
and significant effect of years of education. The effect of education on intermarriage is 
confounded by English proficiency (which is high among the most educated). 
There is no significant effect of the size of the metropolitan population (15 to 
55 years old) in the analyses of intermarriage among Asian men. When context level 
variables were introduced in the model, individual level variables, English proficiency 
and nativity status have shown the effects as expected. As predicted by the 
assimilationist perspective, the probability of interracial marriage is highest in the 
second or higher generation (native-born Asian Americans), and the lowest for the 
first generation. For example, from model 3 in Table 3.5, the odds ratio for a Asian 
man of native-born to out marry is almost 3 times higher of that of a first generation 
(first generation is the reference group, exp(1.06)=2.89). The results confirm that the 
out-group marriage tends to increase with length of U.S. residence and over successive 
generations (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982). In addition, English proficiency has a 
positive effect on interracial marriage. The more fluently an Asian man speaks 
English, the more likely he is to marry out to other races.  
Model 2 allows for a random metropolitan variation, and the residual level 2 
variation (variation between metropolitan areas) is ߪఓଶ ൌ .25. VPC (Variance Partition 
 102 
Coefficient) =ߪఓଶ/ሺߪఓଶ+ߪ௘ଶሻ. However, for multilevel binary logistic models, the 
variance of  ߪ௘ଶ is not available because the error term is not in the equation (4) unlike 
standard multilevel models. Instead, the variance of a standard logistic distribution is 
used7, ߪ௘ଶ ൌ ߨଶ/3 ൌ 3.29. Substituting the values of ߪ௘ଶ ܽ݊݀ ߪఓଶ into the VPC 
equation, we obtain VPC=.25/(.25+3.29)=.071, which indicates that adjusting for the 
effects of individual level and control variables, almost 7.1% of the remaining 
variance in the propensity to marry with other race or ethnicity is due to between- 
metropolitan variation.  
This substantial variation in intermarriage between metropolitan areas in model 
2 indicates the usefulness of a multilevel model for these data. By adding the 
metropolitan-level variables in model 3, the variance drops to a very small figure 
(.007), which is statistically non-significant. This result suggests that almost all of the 
metropolitan-level variance in intermarriage is explained by the specific contextual 
variables considered here.  
The metropolitan-level effects have mixed results, however. As expected, the 
relative group size of Asians has a significant and negative effect on the interracial 
marriage compared to endogamous marriage for Asian men. When percentages of 
Asians are high, Asians have more contact opportunities within their group for 
marriage partners, and are less likely to out marry. This is consistent with Blau’s 
structural opportunity of inter-group relations. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, the Asian sex ratio (logged) has a negative effect on the 
likelihood that Asian men are intermarried versus married to Asian women. Asian men 
                                                 
7 The binary outcomes pij can be re-expressed in terms of a linear model for a continuous latent 
(unobserved) variable pij*, where pij* represents the underlying propensity of being out married 
(category 1) rather than marrying within own group (category 0). Then pij* can be defined just as a 
continuous variable with error term having a logistic normal distribution with ߪ௘ଶ ൌ 3.29. See Bryk and 
Raudenbush (1992) for more discussion about the latent variable representing of a random intercept 
model for binary responses. 
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may be importing home-country brides when an imbalanced sex ratio limits local 
opportunities for within-group marriage. The usual assumption is that Asian men in 
unfavorable marriage markets will consider out-marriage with non-Asians. However, 
in reality, they may also return to their home countries for marriage partners and then 
bring their spouses to the United States. Previous research finds this as a possibility 
(Lievens, 1997). My sample is restricted to Asian men who immigrated to the United 
States before his first marriage. But imported partners can be identified as Asian 
women who immigrated to the United States in the same year as their marriage or who 
arrived later after marriage. Some additional analyses revealed that the marriages of 
863 out of the 3099 Asian men (28%) have a spouse who migrated to the United 
States at the time of marriage or arrived after the marriage. Among these marriages, 
82% involve first generation Asian men. This suggests that when the local marriage 
markets lack sufficient Asian partners, men may adopt the strategy of importing 
spouses from their origin countries.  
Racial heterogeneity index of a metropolitan area shows a negative but non-
significant effect on intermarriage, which implies that higher levels of racial diversity 
in metropolitan areas does not necessarily insure greater opportunities for interracial 
marriage. This finding contradicts the structural perspective based on racial 
composition. In Figure 3.2, we have examined spouses’ race groups for Asians and 
found most intermarriage (around 80%) is formed between an Asian minority and a 
white person. Even though the race groups (other than white group) are more evenly 
distributed, it does not necessarily increase the probability that Asians will marry non-
Asians.  
The results of logistic regression model and multilevel logistic (random 
intercept) models of intermarriage for Asian women who are native born or had 
immigrated to the United States before her first marriage are shown in Table 3.6. The 
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results for Asian women and men are similar with respect to the effects of years of 
education, English proficiency, nativity status8, group size, and racial heterogeneity 
index. For example, relative to non-English speakers (or speak not well), Asian 
women who speak only English at home are 12.8 times higher more likely to 
intermarry.  
There is also gender asymmetry. First, age at first marriage now has a 
significant positive effect on intermarriage. The higher are the ages of Asian women, 
the higher probabilities for them to marry interracially. Second, the sex ratio has 
negative effect on intermarriage among Asian women, which is consistent with 
predictions (contrary to Asian men’s result). When there are fewer Asian men 
available locally, Asian women are more likely to intermarry. I also look at the 
imported partners of Asian women and found that only 6% of the total Asian women 
marriages who have a partner coming to the United States at the time of their marriage 
or after their marriage. Asian women are far less likely than Asian men to import 
spouse. Third, metropolitan population size has significant negative effect on 
intermarriage among Asian women; the larger the population size, the less likely 






                                                 
8 The effect of native-born status (compared to the first generation) becomes significant when 
metropolitan level variables are included in the models. 
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Table 3.6 Single-level and Multilevel Logistic Regression of Intermarriage of Asian 
Women in Metropolitan Areas, ACS 2008 (N= 3,694) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b se b se b se 
Individual effects       
Years of education -0.02 0.015 -0.02 0.015 -0.02 0.015 
Age at 1st marriage 0.08*** 0.007 0.08*** 0.007 0.08*** 0.007 
1.5th gen. 0.35*** 0.100 0.37*** 0.102 0.39*** 0.102 
Native-born 0.19 0.114 0.28* 0.117 0.34** 0.115 
well/very well 1.08*** 0.201 1.13*** 0.206 1.13*** 0.205 
Speak only English 2.43*** 0.215 2.55*** 0.220 2.55*** 0.220 
       
Control variables       
Metropolitan 
population size 
(logged) -0.26*** 0.039 -0.32*** 0.076 -0.26*** 0.051 
       
Metropolitan level       
Group size     -2.49*** 0.361 
Sex ratio (logged)     -2.06*** 0.587 
Racial 
Heterogeneity Index 
    
-0.36 0.431 
       
Constant -1.75*** 0.482 -1.27 0.765 -1.75*** 0.522 
       
Pseudo R2 .13      
Number of 
Metropolitan areas 
  84 84 
Residual Group-
Level Variance 
  .149 0 
 Standard errors in second column 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Conclusion 
Past research on Asian Americans has focused primarily on individual-level 
variables at the national level in order to understand group differences in social 
boundaries and assimilation. Scholars have paid less attention to local marriage market 
conditions, which typically circumscribe patterns of daily interaction. Unfortunately, 
there have been surprisingly few attempts to integrate micro- and macro-level 
explanations that incorporate assimilationist and structural perspectives. The analyses 
presented here have combined the individual-level assimilationist perspective and the 
marco-level structuralist perspective to better understand the marital choices of Asian 
Americans. Multi-level logistic models demonstrated that both levels of independent 
variables are significant and help to explain the variation of intermarriage outcome for 
Asian minorities. Individual-effects remain robust when we control for variation in 
metropolitan-level characteristics and consider alternative model specifications and 
measurement strategies. In addition, when individual-level variables are controlled for, 
differences are found between metropolitan areas. These differences have been 
counted for by the contextual characteristics, which provide mixed results for Blau’s 
structuralist perspective (Blau, 1994).  
At the individual level, the predictions derived from the assimilationist 
perspective on nativity or generation status and language ability have been largely 
confirmed. In general, the Asians born or raised in the United States are more likely 
than foreign-Asians to have greater English language proficiency and to marry 
interracially. The nativity status reflects length of exposure to the mainstream culture 
and the degree of acculturation and structural assimilation (Alba and Nee, 2003; Qian 
and Lichter 2001). These findings are consistent with assimilationist theories. 
However, the effect of educational attainment is confounded by English 
language proficiency and does not show a positive effect on the propensity for 
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intermarriage when the English language abilities remain in the models. This is due to 
the nativity or generation structure of Asian minorities; more than half of Asians in the 
ACS are first generation immigrants.  
Marital choice involves seeking partners with matching assets and 
qualifications. And individuals can be seen as agents who try to maximize their 
utilities by searching for what they regard as the most attractive partner. Preferences 
reflect social and cultural values that often vary among different groups or vary over 
time. Meanwhile, marital selection is also related to and constrained by the 
opportunity structure in the local marriage market. The structure of the local marriage 
market influences opportunities to realize marital preferences.  
Group size enhances opportunities of Asians to marry within their group. The 
racial heterogeneity index was negatively associated with out-marriage, which is 
contrary to predictions of the structuralist perspective. In some additional analyses, I 
substituted another measure of evenness of racial groups, index of dissimilarity9, 
which measures residential segregation between Asians and non-Asians. Segregation 
was not significantly associated with out-marriage, and its inclusion did not eliminate 
or reserve the negative effect of racial heterogeneity on outmarriage. The sex ratio of 
Asian men versus Asian women yields different result for Asian men and women. For 
Asian men, the larger male to female sex ratios were associated with lower interracial 
marriage. Under unfavorable local marriage market conditions, Asian men seemingly 
adopt the strategy of importing partners from their countries of origin. For Asian 
women, the smaller male to female sex ratio is, the more likely for them to enter the 
                                                 
9 It is a measure of evenness with which two groups are distributed across the component geographic 
areas that make up a larger area, and is defined as the proportion of one group members that would have 
to move to achieve an even racial distribution in a neighborhood (Massey and Denton, 1987).  
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intermarriage (in contrast with Asian men, only a few of them import partner from 
back home countries). 
In conclusion, this paper has shown that the multilevel modeling helps to 
decompose the variance of intermarriage to individual level (preference) and context-
level characteristics constraints in the analysis of interracial marriage. Metropolitan-
level variables, which are typically ignored in previous research, provide additional 
understanding of the previous of Asian interracial and endogamous marriage in the 
United States. Studies of interracial marriage can no longer easily overlook the 
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